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MEDELLÍN AND ORIGINALISM
D. A. JEREMY TELMAN*
ABSTRACT
In Medellı́n v. Texas, the Supreme Court permitted Texas to
proceed with the execution of a Mexican national who, in violation
of the United States’ obligations under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, had not been given timely notice of his rights of
consular notification and consultation. It did so despite its finding
that the United States had an obligation under treaty law to comply
with an order of the International Court of Justice that Medellı́n’s
case be granted review and reconsideration. The international obligation, the Court found, was not domestically enforceable because the
treaties at issue were not self-executing. The five Justices who signed
the Chief Justice’s majority opinion, including the Court’s self-proclaimed originalists, joined an opinion that construed the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause without any serious consideration of its
language or the history of its drafting, ignoring evidence of the
Supremacy Clause’s original meaning cited by the dissenting Justices.
This Article explores the meaning of originalism in the context
of the Court’s Medellı́n decision and contends that the majority’s
opinion, while perhaps defensible on other grounds, cannot be reconciled with any identifiable version of originalism. Rather, it is best
understood as a decision reflecting the conservative majority’s political commitment to favor principles of U.S. sovereignty and federalism over compliance with international obligations, even when the
consequence of such a commitment is to enable state governments to
undermine the foreign policy decisions of the political branches of the
federal government.
Ultimately, however, the Article concludes that Medellı́n’s case
never should have come before the Court. The President has a duty
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” The Court determined that the Bush Administration did not satisfy this duty by issuing an Executive Memorandum directing states to comply with the
judgment of the International Court of Justice. That being the case,
the President now must comply with his Take Care Clause duties by
Copyright  2009 by D.A. Jeremy Telman.
* Associate Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. I want to thank those
who commented on earlier drafts of this Article, as well as those who indulged me in conversation and thereby helped me develop my ideas regarding the Medellı́n case and
originalism, including Elizabeth Bruch, Zachary Calo, Stephen Griffin, Richard Stith, and
Alan White. Remaining imperfections in the Article are mine alone.
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working with Congress to make certain that federal law compels compliance with the International Court of Justice’s judgment. Furthermore, this Article contends that the Medellı́n case is emblematic of
the U.S. executive branch’s broader failure to ensure that all treaties
requiring domestic implementation are in fact implemented so as to
avoid placing the United States in violation of its international
obligations.
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III. MEDELLÍN AND THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Bases for Chief Justice Roberts’s Opinion in
Medellı́n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Supremacy Clause and the Doctrine of SelfExecution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. WHAT REMAINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Implementing Treaties through the Take Care
Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Avena, Medellı́n, and the Way Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

378
386
392

R

392
399

R

403

R

405

R

413
420

R

422
424
429

R

INTRODUCTION
[O]riginalism is not, and ha[s] perhaps never been, the sole
method of constitutional exegesis. It would be hard to count on the
fingers of both hands and the toes of both feet, yea, even on the hairs
of one’s youthful head, the opinions that have in fact been rendered
not on the basis of what the Constitution originally meant, but on
the basis of what the judges currently thought it desirable for it to
mean . . . . But in the past, nonoriginalist opinions have almost
always had the decency to lie, or at least to dissemble, about what
they were doing—either ignoring strong evidence of original intent
that contradicted the minimal recited evidence of an original intent
congenial to the court’s desires, or else not discussing original intent
at all, speaking in terms of broad constitutional generalities with no
pretense of historical support.1
1. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989).
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Justice Scalia knows whereof he speaks. In Medellı́n v. Texas,2 the
Supreme Court of the United States found that the State of Texas was
entitled to ignore the ruling of the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”) in the Avena3 case as well as a presidential memorandum directing states to comply with that ruling.4 Thus, the Court permitted
Texas, in violation of the United States’ obligations under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”),5 to proceed with the
execution of a Mexican national who had not been given timely notice of his rights of consular notification and consultation.
It did so without serious consideration of the Supremacy Clause,6
which reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Con-

2. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
3. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
4. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales (Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter President’s Memorandum]. The entire text of the
memorandum is as follows:
SUBJECT: Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of Justice in
Avena
The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(the “Convention”) and the Convention’s Optional Protocol Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol), which gives the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction to decide disputes concerning the “interpretation and application” of the Convention.
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the United States
will discharge its inter-national obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Avena), 2004 ICJ 128 (Mar. 31), by
having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that
decision.
GEORGE W. BUSH
5. Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261; see id. at Art. 36(1)(b) (providing
that, at the request of a foreign national criminal defendant, “the competent authorities of
the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to
custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner”). The ICJ found that the U.S.
had violated its Article 36 obligations with respect to Avena and other Mexican nationals,
including Medellı́n. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 71–72 (finding, by a vote of fourteen to one,
that the United States had violated its obligations under Article 36(1) of the VCCR).
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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One would think that the Court would put some energy into explaining why a state court must be permitted to allow state procedural laws
prohibiting successive habeas petitions to trump a treaty,8 in this case
Article 94 of the United Nations (“U.N.”) Charter,9 which requires
member states to comply with decisions of the ICJ.10 Its holding, in
the end, turns on the doctrine that some treaties are non-self-executing and therefore are not supreme law in the United States unless
implemented through congressional legislation.11 The case marks the
first occasion on which the Court has relied on that doctrine to deny a
treaty-based claim.12 In so doing, the Court makes no effort to square
the doctrine of self-execution with the original meaning of the
Supremacy Clause,13 and it ignores historical legal scholarship cited
by the dissent that suggests that the purpose of the clause was to guarantee that most treaties would be self-executing.14
7. Id.
8. Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008) (reviewing the procedural history
of Medellı́n’s case and noting that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had found that
“neither the Avena decision nor the President’s memorandum was ‘binding federal law’
that could displace the State’s limitations on the filing of successive habeas applications”).
9. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.
10. Id. (requiring member states to “undertake[ ] to comply” with decisions of the
ICJ).
11. See Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1356 (noting that “[t]his Court has long recognized the
distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those
that . . . do not”); id. (explaining the distinction between the different types of treaties
(citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 315 (1829))).
12. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Less Than Zero?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 563 (2008) [hereinafter Vázquez, Less Than Zero] (“Medellı́n v. Texas is the first case in which the Supreme
Court has denied a treaty-based claim solely on the ground that the treaty relied upon was
non-self-executing.”).
13. See infra Part III.
14. See Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1378 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Martin S. Flaherty,
History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the
Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of SelfExecuting Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995) [hereinafter Vázquez, Self-Executing Treaties]). Justice Breyer also includes a “but see” citation to John C. Yoo, Globalism and the
Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1955 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution]. Id. John Yoo’s writings could
have provided an originalist argument in support of the majority’s opinion, were the majority interested in making such arguments. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND
PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 at 215–49 (2005) [hereinafter
YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE] (arguing that self-execution of treaties is inconsistent
with the constitutional design, as it would transfer legislative powers to the executive
branch); Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra, at 1956–62 (examining the Constitution’s text, structure, and history in support of an argument that treaties are presumptively
non-self-executing); John C. Yoo, Rejoinder, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and
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unknown

AND

Seq: 5

ORIGINALISM

26-FEB-09

13:32

381

By joining the opinion in Medellı́n, the Supreme Court’s two selfproclaimed originalists, Justices Scalia15 and Thomas,16 as well as JusStructural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2218–21 (1999) (same). In
any event, scholars have rejected Yoo’s arguments. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra, at 2120–26
(reviewing records of the Constitutional Convention and finding them to support the notion that treaties were to be presumptively self-executing); Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a
Rule of Law in Foreign Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1450, 1451 (2006) (concluding that Yoo
“drifts too far from the Framers’ expressed understandings of their own text, and from the
historical meanings of the words they used”); Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power,
93 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1232 n.75 (2005) [hereinafter Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power] (characterizing Yoo’s position as “in tension with the plain language” of the Supremacy Clause,
not “widely endorsed,” and having “little judicial support”); D.A. Jeremy Telman, Review
Essay, The Foreign Affairs Power: Does the Constitution Matter?, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 245, 283
(2007) (noting that Yoo’s views on self-execution are without support in the historical record); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2161 (1999)
(finding not a shred of evidence to support the view that the Framers intended for the
House of Representatives to have the power to block treaties in force). Additional sources
on which the majority could have relied if it were seeking to make an originalist argument
include Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1479, 1503–13
(2006) (criticizing both Yoo’s and Vazquez’s approaches and defending a theory of partial
non-self-execution according to which “treaties that conflict with existing federal statutory
law do not have the force of domestic law unless and until implemented by Congress”),
and Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 449 (2000) (“The inclusion of treaties in the Supremacy Clause, in
other words, was designed to enhance the ability of the federal government to compel state
compliance with treaties, not to restrict the federal government’s flexibility in determining
whether and how to comply with international law.”).
15. Justices Scalia and Thomas are routinely identified as originalists. See, e.g., Stephen
M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1193 [hereinafter Griffin,
Rebooting Originalism] (describing Justices Scalia and Thomas as “conservative originalists”);
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk 1 (Dec. 30, 2007) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1078933) (identifying
Justices Scalia and Thomas as originalists). Justice Scalia’s writing has identified him as an
originalist in innumerable contexts. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2303
(2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The proper course of constitutional interpretation is to
give the text the meaning it was understood to have at the time of its adoption by the
people.”); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I
take it to be a fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication that the terms in the
Constitution must be given the meaning ascribed to them at the time of their
ratification.”).
16. Justice Thomas has expressly embraced originalism. See Clarence Thomas, Judging,
45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) (reiterating a position expressed in his written opinions that
“judges should seek the original understanding of the [constitutional] provision’s text, if
that text’s meaning is not readily apparent”); Clarence Thomas, How to Read the Constitution, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2008, at A19 (“[T]here are really only two ways to interpret the
Constitution—try to discern as best we can what the framers intended or make it up.”).
Thomas has repeatedly invoked originalism as his preferred method of interpretation in
his legal opinions. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (agreeing with the majority that public schools may prohibit speech advocating illegal drug use but writing separately to stress that the First Amendment, as originally
understood, does not protect student speech in public schools); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 513 U.S. 334, 359 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (concurring in the result but reaching it by means of an inquiry into whether “the phrase ‘freedom of speech, or
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tice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts, who in their Senate confirmation
hearings “evinced considerable sympathy with [the] originalist interpretation,”17 are complicit in a return to what Justice Scalia ironically
dubbed the “decent” judicial opinions of the past, in which judges
dissemble about what they are doing, not discussing original intent or
original meaning at all, and decide cases in accordance with their own
views, with nary a pretense of historical support.18 In Medellı́n, it was
the “living constitutionalists”19 who, with one exception,20 joined in
of the press,’ as originally understood, protected anonymous political leafletting”); Helling
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (finding, based on
the original meaning of “punishment,” that the petitioners cannot rely on the Eighth
Amendment to protest prison conditions). Scholars have noted the originalist cast of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence. See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN
HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 260 (2004) (characterizing Justice
Thomas as making the most extensive originalist case for expanding judicially enforceable
limits on congressional power).
17. Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On Originalism, Due
Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (citing
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 357
(2006) (statement of Samuel A. Alito Jr., J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and
Nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court)); see also Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
John G. Roberts Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 159, 570 (2005) (statement and written response of John G. Roberts
Jr., J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and Nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court)
(stating that, with respect to interpretation of the Constitution, the Court must look at
“what the Framers had in mind when they drafted” a particular constitutional provision).
18. Scalia, supra note 1, at 852.
19. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer are often characterized as being in
the living constitutionalist camp. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, The Limits of Empirical Political
Science and the Possibilities of Living-Constitution Theory for a Retrospective on the Rehnquist Court,
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 737, 749 (2003) (stating that Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer subscribe to an agenda of living constitutionalism essentially consistent with that of
the Warren Court); John C. Eastman, Politics and the Court: Did the Supreme Court Really Move
Left Because of Embarrassment over Bush v. Gore?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1475, 1481 (2006) (naming
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer as the Court’s “living constitutionalists”).
Justice Breyer has made his commitment to living constitutionalism more or less express in
a recent publication. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005) (promoting a form of constitutional interpretation that
takes greater account of the Constitution’s democratic objectives). In that book, Justice
Breyer describes his own approach as seeking to avoid constitutional interpretations that
are either “willful, in the sense of enforcing individual views,” that is simply enforcing
“whatever [the judge] thinks best” or “wooden, in uncritically resting on formulas, in assuming the familiar to be the necessary, in not realizing that any problem can be solved if
only one principle is involved but that unfortunately all controversies of importance involve if not a conflict at least an interplay of principles.” Id. at 18, 19 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
20. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in Medellı́n, in which he relied only on
the language of the relevant treaties in finding them to be non-self-executing, without any
reference to the original meaning of the Supremacy Clause. See Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S.
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Justice Breyer’s dissent.21 That dissent relied heavily on historical
scholarship into the original meaning of the Supremacy Clause22 and,
informed by that historical evidence and by case law largely ignored
by the majority, concluded that the Texas courts are bound, pursuant
to the VCCR, the Optional Protocol to that Convention,23 and Article
94 of the U.N. Charter,24 to implement the ICJ’s Avena decision.25
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, did not engage this historical evidence in earnest, and instead relied on his own idiosyncratic
and poorly documented version of our constitutional history and judicial precedent26 in finding that the relevant treaties are all non-selfexecuting and therefore not enforceable as U.S. law absent congressional implementing legislation.27
This Article will explore the paradoxical refusal of the originalist
Justices to even acknowledge the strong originalist arguments of the
dissenting Justices in Medellı́n. It contributes to the growing literature
that exposes the inconsistency of the Court’s self-proclaimed originalists.28 It would be churlish to point out such inconsistency but for the
Ct. 1346, 1372–73 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding the relevant treaties judicially
unenforceable in light of the treaties’ express provisions).
21. Id. at 1375 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Optional Protocol concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.
24. U.N. Charter art. 94.
25. See Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1375–77.
26. See infra Part III.A.
27. See Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1356 (majority opinion) (finding that because none of the
treaties at issue in Medellı́n create binding federal law in the absence of implementing
legislation and that no such legislation exists, the Avena judgment is not binding domestic
law).
28. See, e.g., KECK, supra note 16, at 258 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court’s conservative majority relies only sporadically on originalist arguments in “activist” decisions); Randy
E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 12
(2006) (contending that Justice Scalia simply discards constitutional provisions that do not
meet with his approval); Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause,
103 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (arguing that Justices Rehnquist’s, Scalia’s, and
Thomas’s interpretations of the Establishment Clause are “remarkably indifferent” to the
original purposes of that clause); Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 25–26 (contending that Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause is not originalist); John F. Stinneford,
The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102
NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1742 (2008) (pointing out Justice Scalia’s willingness to violate his
own originalist principles with respect to the Eighth Amendment); Vázquez, Less Than Zero,
supra note 12, at 569 (hoping that the Medellı́n majority will soon clarify that it did not
intend to read treaties out of the Supremacy Clause in order to show that they are not “fairweather textualists (which is to say, not textualists at all)”). Other scholars have questioned
Justice Scalia’s consistency in interpretive strategies that go beyond constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 671
(1990) (rejecting Justice Scalia’s argument in support of “new textualism,” finding that
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fact that the originalist Justices have been outspoken in defending a
version of originalism that they do not practice, and, in his public
statements on the subject, Justice Scalia has posited a dichotomy between originalism and non-originalism in which he himself does not
believe.29 Such hypocrisy ought not to pass without scholarly comment.30 As Mitchell Berman has recently argued, in at least some of
“the structure and background of the Constitution” do not support “the new textualism
over other theories of statutory interpretation”); William D. Popkin, An “Internal” Critique of
Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1173–86 (1992) (rejecting Justice Scalia’s argument that public respect for the courts is eroded when courts
depart from the textualist approach and inquire into legislative intent); George H. Taylor,
Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 321–27 (1995) (developing a positive account of
the methodology of textualism—as opposed to viewing textualism simply as a critique of
intentionalism—but concluding that textualism does not succeed in limiting or eliminating judicial discretion in statutory or constitutional interpretation); Miranda Oshige McGowan, Do As I Do, Not As I Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning
Method of Statutory Interpretation 10–26 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-015, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1113541 (arguing that Justice Scalia often departs from textualism in statutory
interpretation and that, in cases when he follows his purported methodology, he often
finds, based on resort to an eclectic variety of extrinsic materials, that the assumption in
favor or the ordinary meaning of the statutory language is overcome).
29. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 862 (acknowledging that “there is really no difference between the faint-hearted originalist and the moderate nonoriginalist” and that “most
originalists are faint-hearted and most nonoriginalists are moderate”). Justice Scalia often
claims that being an originalist is tough. He does not just get to vote however he likes in
every case. He illustrated this point with a story about his wife mockingly humming “It’s a
Grand Old Flag” for him when he came down for breakfast the morning after joining in an
opinion that permitted flag burning. See, e.g., Interview by Nina Totenberg with Antonin
Scalia, Supreme Court Justice, in Washington, D.C. (April 28, 2008), http://www.npr.org/
about/press/2008/042808.AntoninScalia.html (telling the “Grand Old Flag” story and noting that “the living constitution jurist is always a happy fella because the case always comes
out the way he thinks it ought to”); Katie Gazella, Scalia Says to Focus on Original Meaning of
Constitution, U. MICH. REC. ONLINE, Nov. 24, 2004, http://www.ur.umich.edu/0405/
Nov22_04/13.shtml (reporting on the “Grand Old Flag” story and noting that being an
originalist does not always make Justice Scalia popular with conservatives); Brian Whitson,
Justice Antonin Scalia: The Case for “Dead Constitution,” WM. & MARY NEWS, Mar. 21, 2004,
http://www.wm.edu/news/archive/index.php/?id=3486 (quoting Justice Scalia as contrasting his experience with that of the “living Constitutional judge” and characterizing the
latter’s position as “[w]hatever he thinks is good, is in the Constitution”).
30. Another theme invoked by Justice Scalia and other originalists is that originalism is
the only coherent approach to constitutional interpretation. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter
J. Smith, Living Originalism 1–2 & n.n.2, 5, 9, 10 (George Washington Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper, Paper No. 393, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090282
(summarizing the views of originalists, including Justice Scalia, Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Randy Barnett, Robert Bork, Edwin Meese III, and Raoul Berger, all of whom contend that
originalism is the only consistent theoretical approach to constitutional interpretation).
Colby and Smith argue, however, that originalism is, in fact, self-contradictory and incoherent and thus is no different from the living constitutionalism that originalists so abhor. See
id. at 58 (characterizing originalism as “a staggering array of often inconsistent approaches . . . [which go] a long way towards creating a living constitutionalism”); see also
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its forms, originalism is, or can be, pernicious.31
It is pernicious because of its tendency to be deployed in the
public square—on the campaign trail, on talk radio, in Senate confirmation hearings, even in Supreme Court opinions—to bolster the popular fable that constitutional
adjudication can be practiced in something close to an objective and mechanical fashion . . . . [T]here is little doubt
that originalism is often used . . . to pander to that American
populist taste for simple answers to complex questions. By
thus nourishing skepticism, even demonization, of judicial
reasoning that cannot be reduced to sound bite, originalism
threatens to undermine the judiciary’s unique and essential
role in our system of government.32
For these reasons, it is important to catalogue each occasion on which
the self-proclaimed prophets of originalism depart from their own
teachings.
This Article does not take the position that the proper result in
Medellı́n should have been determined solely by giving effect to the
Court’s understanding of the original meaning of the Supremacy
Clause, although one certainly expects a constitutional case to be decided with some attention given to the constitutional text at issue and,
if the text is unclear, to its ratification history. Still, this Article maintains that, under the Take Care Clause,33 cases such as Medellı́n should
never arise if the executive branch is serious about its foreign affairs
powers. That is, part of the job of the executive is to make certain that
the United States is in full compliance with its international obligations. It must do so by taking whatever measures are necessary and
effective to assure that such obligations are enforceable in domestic
courts, wherever international obligations require such enforcement.
While the Medellı́n majority permitted the State of Texas to determine
the foreign policy of the United States, the Supreme Court was in a
position to permit Texas to do so only because successive presidential
administrations lacked the political will to guarantee that VCCR rights
(as well as innumerable other rights created under treaties ratified by
the United States) were enforceable in U.S. courts.
After a brief review of the background, facts, and relevant procedural history of Medellı́n in Part I of the Article, Part II reviews the
Berman, supra note 15, at 11–12 (contending that “originalist logical space” can be represented by a matrix “consisting of 72 distinct theses”).
31. Berman, supra note 15, at 5.
32. Id. at 5–6.
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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development of originalist doctrine, with a brief discussion of the
commitment to original meaning associated with the positions of Justices Thomas and Scalia. Part III discusses the Medellı́n opinions in the
context of historical scholarship on the meaning of the Supremacy
Clause and the development of the doctrine of self-execution. Part IV
offers a model for how the political branches might reconcile a properly historicized approach34 to the Supremacy Clause with the Take
Care Clause regardless of the Court’s views of the doctrine of selfexecution.35 In brief, this Article argues that in order to avoid situations in which congressional inaction or state opposition creates tensions between U.S. obligations under international law and domestic
law, the President must take care to use political and legal means to
persuade Congress to make our international obligations enforceable
as domestic law wherever compliance with a treaty demands congressional implementation.
I. THE BACKGROUND

TO

MEDELLÍN V. TEXAS

On June 24, 1993, José Ernesto Medellı́n, a Mexican national and
a member of the “Black and Whites” street gang, participated in an
attack on two Houston teenagers, Jennifer Ertman and Elizabeth
Pena.36 Gang members raped the girls for over an hour and then
murdered them to prevent them from identifying their attackers.37
Medellı́n himself strangled at least one of the girls with her own shoelace.38 Medellı́n was arrested five days later.39 Within hours of his
arrest, he signed a written waiver and gave a detailed written confession.40 Before he made this confession, Medellı́n was advised of his
Miranda rights.41 He was not advised, however, of his rights as a Mexican national under the VCCR42 to seek legal advice from the Mexican
34. For a historicist critique of originalism, see STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTIFROM THEORY TO POLITICS 164–69 (1996) [hereinafter GRIFFIN, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM]; Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, supra note 15, at 1213–20.
35. The opinion in Medellı́n also addresses the power of the President to direct state
courts to implement a decision of an international tribunal. See Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S.
Ct. 1346, 1353 (2008) (setting forth the two legal issues in the case). On that subject, the
constitutional text provides only the most general guidance and so a discussion of that part
of the opinion would go beyond the scope of this Article. That part of the opinion will be
the subject of a separate article, Medellı́n and the State as Unitary Actor in International Legal
Theory.
36. Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1354.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 5, at art. 36(1)(b).
TUTIONALISM:
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consulate.43 Medellı́n was convicted of capital murder and sentenced
to death. In 1997, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld both
Medellı́n’s conviction and his sentence.44
Years later, while Medellı́n was on death row in Texas and his
petition for habeas corpus worked its way through the federal
courts,45 Mexico brought a case in the ICJ against the United States
on behalf of Medellı́n and other Mexican nationals46 who were convicted in courts within the United States without being given the access to consul for which the VCCR provided.47 This case, known as
Avena,48 was the third in a trilogy of cases brought before the ICJ by
States whose nationals were facing the death penalty in the United
States and had been denied their VCCR rights.49
In the first case, brought in April 1998, Paraguay instituted proceedings against the United States and sought a retrial of a
Paraguayan national, Angel Francisco Breard, who had been sentenced to death in Virginia in 1993, but had been denied his consular
consultation rights in connection with his arrest and prosecution for
rape and murder.50 In 1996, Paraguay also attempted to use domestic
legal mechanisms to have a court declare Breard’s conviction and
death sentence void and to enjoin Virginia state officials from pursuing a criminal conviction against him in any manner inconsistent with
43. Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1354.
44. Id. at 1354–55.
45. Id. at 1355.
46. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 24–25 (Mar.
31) (listing Medellı́n (#38) among the Mexican nationals on whose behalf Mexico sought
relief).
47. Id. at 17, 23. The ICJ had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to the Optional Protocol to the VCCR, which the United States ratified together with the VCCR in 1969, and
provides the ICJ with jurisdiction to hear disputes arising under the VCCR. Medellı́n, 128 S.
Ct. at 1353. In response to the Avena decision, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol. Id. at 1354 (citing Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State,
to Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations (Mar. 7, 2005)).
48. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12.
49. See John F. Murphy, Medellı́n v. Texas: Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision for
the United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV.
247, 253–59 (2008) (recounting the litigation relating to Angel Francisco Breard, a
Paraguayan sentenced to death for a murder committed in Virginia, and Karl and Walter
LaGrand, West Germans sentenced to death for a murder committed in Arizona).
50. Application of the Republic of Paraguay, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) (Apr. 3, 1998), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/99/
7183.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2009); see also Jonathan I. Charney & W. Michael Reisman,
Agora: Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 666, 666–67, 669–70 (1998) (setting forth the
underling facts of Breard’s case and discussing Paraguay’s proceedings against the United
States in the ICJ).
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the VCCR.51 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia found, however, that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Paraguay’s claims.52 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed on the same ground,53 and the Supreme
Court refused to review that decision.54
On April 9, 1998, the ICJ voted unanimously to indicate provisional measures that directed the United States to ensure that Breard
was not executed prior to the ICJ’s final decision.55 The Clinton Administration’s response was ambivalent. On the one hand, the Secretary of State sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia, urging the
Governor not to allow Breard’s execution to proceed.56 At the same
time, the Clinton Administration filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court, urging the Court to deny both a writ of certiorari and a
stay in Breard’s habeas petition on the ground that the ICJ’s provisional measures are not binding on the United States.57 By a six to
three vote, the Supreme Court denied Breard’s petition for habeas
corpus and for certiorari on April 14, 1998.58 The Governor of Virginia refused to issue a stay of execution,59 and Breard was executed
that same day.60 Paraguay eventually dropped its suit against the
United States in the ICJ.61
Within months of Paraguay’s withdrawal of its suit, Germany initiated an action against the United States in the ICJ on behalf of two of
51. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 134
F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998).
52. See id. at 1272–73 (finding that the Eleventh Amendment divested the court of
subject-matter jurisdiction over the relief Paraguay sought because the Virginia officials
were no longer in violation of the treaties).
53. See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 629 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the Eleventh Amendment does not permit federal courts to provide a remedy based on
state officials’ past violations).
54. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378–79 (1998) (per curiam).
55. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 258 (Provisional Measures Order of Apr. 9).
56. See Charney & Reisman, supra note 50, at 671–72 (providing an excerpt of the April
13, 1998 letter from then-U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to then-Governor of
Virginia James S. Gilmore III requesting that the Governor suspend the execution).
57. See id. at 672–73 (providing an excerpt of the Clinton Administration’s amicus
brief); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
49–51, Breard, 523 U.S. 371 (Nos. 97-1390 and 97-8214).
58. Breard, 523 U.S. at 378–79; see Charney & Reisman, supra note 50, at 673 (noting
that the Court denied the petitions by a vote of six to three).
59. See Charney & Reisman, supra note 50, at 674–75 (noting the Virginia Governor’s
refusal to issue a stay and providing an excerpt of the Governor’s statements supporting his
decision to deny a stay).
60. Murphy, supra note 49, at 257.
61. Id.
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its nationals, Walter and Karl LaGrand, who were facing execution for
a murder committed in Arizona in 1982.62 Although the LaGrands
were tried and sentenced in 1984, the fact that they had been denied
their VCCR rights did not come to light until 1992.63 The Supreme
Court denied their final habeas appeal in November 1998,64 after the
Ninth Circuit had rejected their VCCR claim as procedurally defaulted.65 Karl LaGrand was executed on February 23, 1999, one week
before Germany initiated its suit in the ICJ.66
Germany acted in time to permit the ICJ to issue a provisional
measures order to prevent the execution of Walter LaGrand as scheduled on March 3, 1999.67 Germany also had filed a suit in the Supreme Court, but on the day of the execution, the Court refused to
exercise its original jurisdiction in the case.68 Despite a recommendation from Arizona’s Board of Executive Clemency that the Governor
should grant a sixty-day reprieve because Germany’s ICJ case had just
been filed, Arizona Governor Jane Hull ordered the execution to proceed as scheduled,69 and LaGrand was executed later that evening.70
Unlike Paraguay, Germany continued to pursue its case before
the ICJ, despite its inability to win a judgment that could benefit the
LaGrand brothers.71 Rather than seeking compensation for the harm
it suffered as a result of the U.S. breach of its VCCR obligations, Germany sought assurances that further breaches would not occur.72 The
Court, for the most part, granted Germany the remedy it sought, holding that the United States must provide effective review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of foreign nationals who
were denied their VCCR rights, so as to guarantee the “effective exer62. See Bruno Simma & Carsten Hoppe, The LaGrand Case: A Story of Many Miscommunications, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 371, 380 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007) (stating
that Germany filed its application with the ICJ on March 2, 1999, the day before Walter
LaGrand was scheduled to be executed).
63. Id. at 378.
64. LaGrand v. Stewart, 525 U.S. 971, 971 (1998) (mem.).
65. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261–62 (9th Cir. 1998).
66. Simma & Hoppe, supra note 62, at 379–80.
67. See Murphy, supra note 49, at 258 (explaining that the ICJ issued a provisional measures order on March 13, 1999, to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed).
68. Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111–12 (1999) (per
curiam).
69. Simma & Hoppe, supra note 62, at 380.
70. Murphy, supra note 49, at 258.
71. See id. at 258–59 (“Unlike Paraguay in the Breard case, however, Germany did not
withdraw its case from the ICJ.”).
72. LaGrand (Germany v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 474 (June 27).
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cise of the rights” under the VCCR, but the ICJ left the choice of
means for so doing up to the United States.73
It came as no surprise that the ICJ, in the Avena case, found that
the United States had violated its obligations under the VCCR,74 just
as it had found in the LaGrand case.75 Mexico requested that the ICJ
issue an order directing the United States to vacate the convictions
and sentences of the Mexican nationals convicted and sentenced in
violation of the VCCR and requiring the suppression of any statements or confessions made by those Mexican nationals prior to notification of their VCCR rights.76 The ICJ opted for a more lenient
penalty, requiring U.S. courts to provide “review and reconsideration”
of the convictions and sentences of the affected Mexican nationals.77
The Supreme Court initially granted certiorari to hear Medellı́n’s
VCCR claim,78 but then dismissed the petition for certiorari as improvidently granted in order to give the Texas courts an opportunity
to provide the review and reconsideration that the ICJ called for in
Avena.79
This was necessary because, while Medellı́n’s habeas petition was
pending before the Supreme Court, and although the United States
disagreed with the Avena decision,80 President Bush issued a memorandum to the Attorney General stating that the United States would
comply with the Avena judgment by directing state courts to implement the ICJ’s decision.81
In Medellı́n’s case, the Texas criminal courts refused to do so.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellı́n’s post-Avena
73. See id. at 513, 516 (noting that Germany sought assurances that the United States
will comply with its obligations under the VCCR and finding that the United States must
permit review of VCCR violations “by means of its own choosing”).
74. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 53–55 (Mar. 31).
75. See Simma & Hoppe, supra note 62, at 388 (“The ICJ, faced with the same treaty and
a substantially similar situation as in LaGrand . . . produced a judgment that was, to nobody’s surprise, very similar to its judgment in LaGrand.”).
76. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 21. Mexico also requested an order prohibiting the United
States from relying on any procedural penalty or any other domestic law that would deny
relief to Mexican nationals affected by the decision. Id. at 21–22.
77. Id. at 72.
78. Medellı́n v. Dretke, 543 U.S. 1032, 1032 (2004) (mem.).
79. Medellı́n v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666–67 (2005) (per curiam).
80. See Verbatim Record ¶ 6, at 10, Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Remarks of John B. Bellinger
III, June 19, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14592.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) (“We did not agree with that decision—no losing litigant ever does—
but we take our international legal obligations extremely seriously and therefore we respect the Court’s decision.”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984) (stating that the
President does not agree with the ICJ’s interpretation of the VCCR in Avena).
81. President’s Memorandum, supra note 4.
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habeas petition as an abuse of the writ.82 The Texas court did not
view either the Avena decision or the President’s memorandum as capable of displacing state limitations on the filing of successive habeas
applications.83
In Medellı́n v. Texas,84 the United States Supreme Court agreed.85
In a decision written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court concluded
that “neither Avena nor the President’s Memorandum constitutes directly enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the
filing of successive habeas petitions.”86 In so doing, the Medellı́n majority found that the international obligations that might render the
Avena decision “directly enforceable federal law”—the VCCR’s Optional Protocol, and Article 94 of the U.N. Charter—were non-selfexecuting treaties that had never been implemented through congressional legislation.87
That the five conservative members of the Court found that a decision of the ICJ does not trump state law surprised few, although
some predicted that the Roberts Court, protective as it has been of the
President’s foreign affairs powers, would order Texas to comply with
the President’s memorandum.88 It is surprising that, in reaching that
82. See Ex parte Medellı́n, 223 S.W.3d 315, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (finding no legal
basis for the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the ICJ Avena decision and the
presidential memorandum do not constitute binding federal law).
83. Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008); Ex parte Medellı́n, 223 S.W.3d at
352.
84. 128 S. Ct. 1346.
85. Id. at 1353. This holding, in and of itself, was not a surprise, given that the Court
had already held that states may apply the procedural default rule to bar VCCR claims. See
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006).
86. Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1353.
87. See id. at 1357 (“Because none of these treaty sources creates binding federal law in
the absence of implementing legislation, and because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we conclude that the Avena judgment is not automatically binding domestic
law.”).
88. See Vázquez, Less Than Zero, supra note 12, at 563 (admitting that he expected that
the Court would defer to the President’s memorandum); Julian Ku, Medellin Gets Yet Another Day at the U.S. Supreme Court: This Time He Should Win, http://opiniojuris.org/2007/
10/10/medellin-gets-yet-another-day-at-the-us-supreme-court-this-time-he-should-win (last
visited Feb. 13, 2009) (predicting that Medellı́n would prevail because of the President’s
memorandum directing states to implement the ICJ’s Avena decision). Ku’s prediction was
supported by his own scholarship and that of others. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, International
Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 WASH. L. REV. 1, 45–47 (2006) (contending
that the President can implement international tribunal judgments pursuant to executive
foreign affairs powers); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 683, 685–86 (1998) (contending that the President, pursuant to the Constitution’s Take Care Clause, could have
ordered the effectuation of the ICJ’s provisional measures in the Breard case and thus prevented Breard’s execution).
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conclusion, the majority devoted so little attention to the original
meaning of the constitutional text with regard to whether and when
international agreements should be given direct effect as domestic
law. More surprising still, the majority devoted very little attention to
the original meaning despite the fact that the non-originalist dissenters cite to the work of legal scholars who have explored the issue in
great detail.89 While the Justices in the majority are free to be unpersuaded by the work of mere academics, it is surprising that they did
not even attempt to address the overwhelming evidence of an original
meaning of the Supremacy Clause, enforced in dozens of cases listed
in an appendix to the dissenting opinion,90 at odds with the majority’s
ruling.
II. ORIGINALISM

AND THE

MEDELLÍN OPINIONS

A. Varieties of Originalist Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation
As an articulated theory of constitutional interpretation, originalism is of rather recent vintage.91 However, originalism has evolved
rapidly and with great contestation,92 and debates within originalism
89. See Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1378–79 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Flaherty, supra
note 14; Vázquez, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 14; Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L.
REV. 571 (2007)). The dissenters, in keeping with their refusal to embrace a principled
originalism, do not base their position solely on the original meaning of the Constitution.
Rather, they also argue for a historical tradition of giving direct domestic effect to treaties
that they are persuaded are consistent with the original meaning of the Supremacy Clause.
See id. at 1378–83. They also point to case law relating to claims settlements in which
Presidents used their Article II power pursuant to a ratified treaty to set aside state law. See
id. at 1390–91 (stating that, while Supreme Court case law on this issue is limited, the
Court “has made clear” that the President has authority to implement international claims
settlement notwithstanding contrary state law). The majority opinion does respond to the
dissent’s arguments relating to claims settlements. See id. at 1371–72 (majority opinion).
90. See id. at 1392–93 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing twenty-nine Supreme Court cases
decided between 1794 and 2004 in which the Court held a treaty to be self-executing,
twelve of which involved enforcement of a treaty despite contrary state or territorial law or
policy).
91. See, e.g., Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, supra note 15, at 1194–96 (noting that various
contemporary methods of non-originalist constitutional interpretation are rooted in traditions that extend back to the time of the adoption of the Constitution and were employed
by Justice John Marshall); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 599, 599 (2004) (conceding that, for much of U.S. history, originalism “was not a
terribly self-conscious theory of constitutional interpretation”).
92. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, supra note 15, at 1188–90 (summarizing the development of new originalism in the 1990s in response to old originalism that arose in the
1960s); Whittington, supra note 91, at 599 (describing old originalism as having flourished
from the 1960s thorough the mid-1980s, while new originalism has flourished since the
early 1990s). For a remarkably concise and authoritative history of originalism, see Randy
E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 611–13 (1999).
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have become extremely complicated.93 Generations of scholars have
now debated the original meaning of originalism.94 The history of
originalism has been recounted numerous times in recent scholarship.95 Because the topic has been so exhaustively covered elsewhere,
a short summary is all that is called for here.
To the extent that originalism can be reduced to its core, it consists of the view that “only certain sorts of historical evidence, such as
the understandings of constitutional meaning of the Philadelphia
framers or ratifiers of the Constitution, are legitimate in constitutional
interpretation.”96 Originalists and non-originalists alike provide similar definitions.97 Parsimony is the key advantage of originalism as a
theory of constitutional adjudication: The judge’s role is to discover

93. See Colby & Smith, supra note 30, at 4–5 (arguing that originalism is so conflicted as
to be incoherent; describing it as “a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that
share little in common except a misleading reliance on a single label”).
94. See, e.g., Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86
GEO. L.J. 569, 570–71 (1998) (criticizing Justice Scalia’s view that originalism must entail
fidelity to original practices and proposing an originalism committed to enforcing original
principles embodied in the Constitution); Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77, 79 (1988) (arguing that the Framers were “hospitable to the use of original intent in the sense of ratifier intent, which is the original intent in
a constitutional sense”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 888 (1985) (arguing that the original version of “original intent” focused not on the expectations of the Framers but on the “rights and powers sovereign
polities could delegate to a common agent without destroying their own essential autonomy,” making “original intentionalism” into a form of structural interpretation).
95. For excellent, succinct summaries covering the history of originalism, see Barnett,
supra note 92, at 611–29; Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False
Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 530–33 (2008); Whittington, supra note 91,
at 599–603. Daniel Farber provides a concise narrative account of early originalism in
Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085
(1989).
96. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, supra note 15, at 1187.
97. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 15, at 3 (stating that originalism maintains that courts
should interpret constitutional provisions solely in accordance with some feature of those
provisions’ original character); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 (1980) (defining originalism as the “approach to constitutional adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the
intentions of its adopters”); Farber, supra note 95, at 1086 (“Originalists are committed to
the view that original intent is not only relevant but authoritative, that we are in some sense
obligated to follow the intent of the framers.”); Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten
Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 221 (1988) (describing textualists such as Judge
Robert Bork as treating “the constitutional text as the sole legitimate source of operative
norms of constitutional law”); Scalia, supra note 1, at 851–52 (describing the “originalist”
approach to constitutional interpretation as seeking to establish the meaning of the Constitution in 1789 based on the Constitution’s text and overall structure as well as the contemporaneous understanding of the relevant text).
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the original meaning of the Constitution and rule in accordance with
that meaning.98
Originalism began as a response to the Warren and Burger
Courts.99 Just as romantic conservatism evolved as a response to enlightenment rationalism,100 and just as modern conservatism in the
United States emerged as a response to the perceived excesses of progressive movements from Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal to Lyndon
Johnson’s Great Society,101 originalism was “a reactive theory”102 that
sought to reign in judicial activism by advocating that judges focus
their interpretive energies on giving effect to the original meaning of
the Constitution.103 As such, the old originalism had a clear political
agenda,104 and it assumed that its agenda could be realized if judges
respected the wills of legislatures.105 That assumption now seems
oddly misplaced, since originalist Justices have proven themselves at
least as willing to strike down legislation as non-originalist Justices.106
98. See Colby & Smith, supra note 30, at 2 (noting that according to originalist proponents, the “predictability, determinacy, and coherence of the originalist approach both
respects law and constrains judges”).
99. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, supra note 15, at 1188; see also Colby & Smith, supra
note 30, at 6 (explaining that the “sweeping decisions of the Warren Court” led conservatives to insist that “the Constitution be interpreted to give effect to the intent of the
framers”).
100. See H.G. SCHENK, THE MIND OF THE EUROPEAN ROMANTICS 3–8 (1966) (characterizing romanticism as a reaction against rationalism).
101. See GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA
SINCE 1945, at xii (1976) (defining American post-war conservatism as being animated by
“resistance to certain forces perceived to be leftist, revolutionary, and profoundly subversive of what conservatives at the time deemed worth cherishing, defending, and perhaps
dying for”); Jonathan Rieder, The Rise of the “Silent Majority,” in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930–1980, at 243, 243–44 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989)
(attributing the rise of populist conservatism to feelings of resentment, betrayal, and unhappiness with the cultural and political changes in American society from the New Deal
to the civil rights movement).
102. Whittington, supra note 91, at 601; see also id. (“It is important to note that originalism was a reactive theory motivated by substantive disagreement with the recent and thencurrent actions of the Warren and Burger Courts . . . .”); id. at 604 (“As a reactive and
critical posture, the old originalism thrived only in opposition.”).
103. Id. at 601.
104. Id. at 602, 602–03 n.21 (concluding that old originalists were “primarily concerned
with empowering popular majorities,” which also entailed upholding government power).
105. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 4, 18 (2d ed. 1997) (lamenting
the Warren Court’s reading of “its libertarian convictions into the Fourteenth Amendment” and claiming that it has, through its reading of that Amendment, exceeded its
power by rewriting the Constitution); ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH:
MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 109 (1996) (stating that the Supreme Court
has usurped the powers of the American people and their representatives in pursuit of leftwing policy-making).
106. See KECK, supra note 16, at 40 tbl. 2.1 (indicating that, on an annual basis, between
1995 and 2003, the Rehnquist Court struck down far more federal statutes on constitu-
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In its first iteration, originalism focused on the original intent of
the Constitution’s Framers and ratifiers to clarify ambiguous constitutional provisions.107 But two scholarly criticisms effectively demolished the original intentions approach108 by demonstrating first, the
implausibility of reconstructing the original intentions of the Framers,109 and second, the Framers’ reluctance to have interpretations of
the Constitution depend on claimed knowledge of their original intentions.110 Originalism, now called “new originalism,” quickly overcame these objections by shifting from a focus on intention to a focus
on the public meaning of the constitutional text as adopted111—that
is, on the meaning that the text would have for an ordinary eighteenth-century reader. This shift is especially significant for the purposes of this Article because Justice Scalia was one of the earliest
advocates of the shift from subjective intention to textual meaning.112
New originalism has expanded beyond the reactive gestures of
old originalism. It no longer seeks to hold the judiciary in check.113
tional grounds than did the supposedly activist Burger and Warren Courts); id. at 268
(stating that Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and Scalia all support judicial activism when they
believe the original Constitution calls for it); Mark A. Graber, Clarence Thomas and the Perils
of Amateur History, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 70, 87 (Earl
M. Maltz ed., 2003) (noting that Justice Thomas “exhibits no tendency to defer to local or
national legislators”).
107. See Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, supra note 15, at 1188 (stating that old originalism
was committed to following the Framers’ intent “no matter what the result”).
108. See Barnett, supra note 92, at 611–12 (describing the original intentions approach
as having been “trounced” by its critics); id. at 613 (“If ever a theory had a stake driven
through its heart, it seems to be originalism.”); Colby & Smith, supra note 30, at 7 (stating
that original intent theory met with “savage criticism” that exposed its two fundamental
weaknesses).
109. See Brest, supra note 97, at 222 (concluding that an “interpreter’s understanding of
the original understanding may be so indeterminate as to undermine the rationale for
originalism” in the case of many controversial constitutional provisions).
110. See Powell, supra note 94, at 906–07 (pointing out the Federalists’ view that the
intentions of the drafters of the Constitution would not be legally relevant because they
were “mere scriveners” appointed to draft an instrument for the people).
111. Whittington, supra note 91, at 609.
112. See Barnett, supra note 28, at 9 (“Justice Scalia was perhaps the first defender of
originalism to shift the theory from its previous focus on the intentions of the framers of
the Constitution to the original public meaning of the text at the time of its enactment.”);
Colby & Smith, supra note 30, at 7 (citing Justice Scalia’s “campaign to change the label
from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning”); Caleb Nelson,
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 554–55 (2003) (crediting
Justice Scalia with the suggestion, accepted by most originalists, to change the label of the
doctrine from original intent to original meaning).
113. See, e.g., KECK, supra note 16, at 267–68 (indicating that the Rehnquist Court’s
originalists were not averse to activism in support of their originalism); David R. Dow et al.,
Judicial Activism on the Rehnquist Court: An Empirical Assessment, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 35, 71–97 (2008) (providing a statistical breakdown of the Justices’ votes on an issueby-issue basis and concluding that “Justice Scalia votes to thwart the majority in cases where
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Rather, it recognizes that originalism might “require the active exercise of the power of judicial review in order to keep faith with the
principled commitments of the founding.”114 Moreover, originalism
is no longer tethered to a political agenda;115 it seeks not to criticize
an overreaching court but to engage previously unexplored aspects of
our constitutional history.116 New originalism has also developed a
body of normative theory to justify reliance on original meaning.117
Still, new originalism has much in common with old originalism.
Like old originalism, new originalism “regards the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present.”118
New originalists concede some of the criticisms of original intent
originalism, but claim that such criticisms are largely irrelevant to
their own version of originalism.119 This claim is not entirely convincing for, as critics of new originalism have pointed out, the sources that
the majoritarian view ought to rule”); Graber, supra note 106, at 71 (noting that Justice
Thomas “would overrule a remarkable number of cases, some dating back more than two
hundred years, in the name of originalism”); Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 132 & n.408 (2007) (noting that
the Court’s remedies jurisprudence supports the views of those who characterize the Rehnquist Court as activist and citing numerous scholars who have so argued).
114. Whittington, supra note 91, at 609.
115. Conservative originalist Steven Calabresi recently welcomed the work of Jack
Balkin, like that of Akhil Amar, in what Calebresi calls “the pantheon of liberal originalism.” Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism 2 (Nw. U.
Sch. Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, Paper No. 08-38), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1294787.
116. See Whittington, supra note 91, at 608 (noting Randy Barnett’s research into the
origins of the commerce clause, Barnett and Don Kates’s research on the origins of the
Second Amendment, John Yoo’s originalist approach to war powers, and Steven Calebresi
and Christopher Yoo’s article on the historical origins of the concept of a unitary
executive).
117. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 110–59 (1999) (developing a defense of originalism based on a version of popular sovereignty that he dubs “potential sovereignty”); Barnett, supra note 92, at 629–43 (developing a defense of originalism based on principles that
inform doctrines in contract law such as the statute of frauds and the parole evidence
rule); see generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Desirable Constitution and
the Case for Originalism (Nw. U. Sch. Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, Research Paper
No. 08-05), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1109247 (providing a consequentialist
defense of originalism).
118. Whittington, supra note 91, at 599 (stating that old and new originalism share this
basic theory).
119. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 94–95 (2004) (noting that early critics of originalism, such as Paul Brest and H.
Jefferson Powell, “left considerable room for originalism,” understood in this context as
textualism rather than intentionalism, to “flourish”). For an earlier iteration of the same
arguments, reconciling the views of Brest and Powell with new originalism, see Barnett,
supra note 92, at 623–29.
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new originalists use to demonstrate original public meaning tend to
be the same sources that old originalists used to demonstrate original
intentions.120 At least some new originalists concede this point.121
More generally, scholars have begun to suggest that originalism
can be reconciled with its theoretical nemesis,122 which is variously
known as living constitutionalism123 (my preferred term), nonoriginalism,124 pluralism,125 and developmental theory.126 We are all
originalists to the extent that we must at least in some circumstances
care about what constitutional language meant at the time it was
drafted rather than what it might mean to us now. The Guarantee
Clause,127 for example, refers to “domestic violence.”128 As Jack
120. See, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
THE BASIC QUESTIONS 79 n.1 (2007) (“The distinction between intention and meaning is a
refinement that cuts no ice with us.”); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 n.130 (1981) (“[T]he difficulties of ascertaining the intent of the
ratifiers leaves little choice but to accept the intent of the Framers as a fair reflection of
it.”); Nelson, supra note 112, at 557 (pointing out that original intent and original meaning
most likely align in most cases and where they do not, modern readers are not well positioned to discern original meaning); Telman, supra note 14, at 261 & n.106 (noting that
textualist and intentionalist approaches are not as divergent as they may appear, since
practitioners of both approaches rely on the same sources of information to establish the
meaning of the Constitution).
121. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 92, at 617 (remarking that the distinction between
textualism and originalism is hard to maintain); Whittington, supra note 91, at 610 (noting
that the history of the constitutional drafting process can provide useful information about
how the text was understood at the time and the significance of specific language that was
included in or excluded from the document).
122. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 428 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Original Meaning] (contending that, unlike
nonoriginalists, living constitutionalists and originalists are faithful to the Constitution’s
text and its principles); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
291, 292 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion] (contending that “the debate between
originalism and living constitutionalism rests on a false dichotomy”); see also Colby &
Smith, supra note 30, at 5 (arguing that originalists, in their internal debates, have produced their own version of living constitutionalism).
123. See Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 122, at 428 (identifying himself as both an
originalist and a living constitutionalist).
124. Id. (distinguishing non-originalism and living constitutionalism while acknowledging that neither is considered an originalist form of constitutional interpretation); see also
Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, supra note 15, at 1187 (“[T]he alternative to originalism is not
‘nonoriginalism,’ but rather traditional or conventional constitutional interpretation,
which features a variety of forms, modes, or methods.”). But Griffin acknowledges that the
division of scholars into originalism and nonoriginalism remains widespread. Id. at
1191–92 & nn.41–45.
125. See GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 34, at 143–52 (describing the
pluralist theory of constitutional interpretation).
126. See Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, supra note 15, at 1188 (describing “developmental
theory” as an alternative to originalism).
127. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
128. Id.
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Balkin points out, in the eighteenth century, that phrase meant exclusively “riots or disturbances within a state,” while today we associate
the phrase with “assaults and batteries by intimates or by persons living in the same household.”129 It would be absurd to seek to change
our constitutional order simply because of a change in linguistic usage.130 Similarly, living constitutionalists have not sought to impose a
more modern meaning on the Constitution’s requirement that the
President be thirty-five years of age,131 despite the fact that one could
argue that the Framers simply intended that the President be a person
of mature years.132 Indeed, there are no scholars who would argue
that the original meaning of the Constitution is irrelevant to debates
about its contemporary meaning.133
Just as there are limits to living constitutionalism, most originalists also acknowledge limits to their own principles of constitutional
interpretation.134 In sum, living constitutionalists are not distinct
from originalists because they pay no attention to the original meaning of the Constitution. What separates living constitutionalists from
originalists is the extent to which they are willing to incorporate interpretive materials other than literal original meaning into their understanding of what the Constitution demands of us today.

129. Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 122, at 430.
130. See id. at 429–30 (arguing for a form of originalism, compatible with living constitutionalism, in which legal meaning is preserved).
131. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
132. See Balkin, Abortion, supra note 122, at 305 (noting that his underlying principles
approach to constitutional interpretation does not override the textual command when
the text is “relatively rule-like, concrete and specific”).
133. See, e.g., YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 14, at 25 (noting that
academics differ over how much deference to accord the Framers, not over whether or not
they are due any deference at all); Farber, supra note 95, at 1086 (“Almost no one believes
that the original understanding is wholly irrelevant to modern-day constitutional interpretation.”); Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, supra note 15, at 1193 (“Scholars today distinguish
among forms of originalism, not between originalism and nonoriginalism.”). Eric Posner
briefly posed an exception to this general rule. See Posting of Eric Posner to Opinio Juris,
http://opiniojuris.org/2007/08/21/the-founders/ (Aug. 21, 2007, 12:01 AM EDT) (“If
academics on both sides of the issue could agree to debate the presidency, emergency
powers, and the [C]onstitution without mentioning the framers, this alone would count as
progress.”). But even Posner cannot resist reference to the Framers as authority. See Posting of Eric Posner to Opinio Juris, http://opiniojuris.org/2007/08/21/the-president-versus-the-presidency/ (Aug. 21, 2007, 11:03 AM EDT) (commenting “oops!” on his own
invocation of the founders as authority for his view of presidential power, but invoking
them nonetheless).
134. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 864 (conceding that he would not uphold a statute
calling for the punishment of flogging even if such a statute would have been permissible
in 1789).
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B. Originalism and the Practice of the Medellı́n Court
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions in Medellı́n are
originalist opinions. As explained in Part III, Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion is true neither to the original meaning of the Supremacy
Clause nor to the early precedents, on which the opinion purports to
rely, regarding the extent to which treaties must be given direct effect
as binding U.S. law.135 Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion takes the
constitutional text and the early precedents more seriously, but he
does so, appropriately enough, within the context of a broader appreciation of constitutional text, structure, and history, as one would expect from a Justice committed to a version of living
constitutionalism.136 It is not inconsistent for a living constitutionalist
to pay close attention to the original meaning of the constitutional
text.137
As originalism comes in many variations, however, perhaps we
should not be too hasty in criticizing the originalist Justices for signing
off on Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion. Justice Scalia describes himself
as a “faint-hearted originalist”138 and acknowledges that there are
problems with originalist methodology.139 For example, Justice Scalia
recognizes that the originalist enterprise really requires training in
historical research, a task for which most judges are ill-prepared.140
Even a professional historian would need more time to undertake the
originalist task properly than a judge typically has to decide a case.141
In the end, however, Justice Scalia defends his originalism based
on Gilbert Chesterton’s aphorism that a “thing worth doing is worth
135. See infra Part III.A.
136. See infra Part III.B.
137. See Berman, supra note 15, at 22 (stating that non-originalism regards original
meaning as relevant to judicial interpretation but that post-ratification facts can also bear
on interpretation).
138. Scalia, supra note 1, at 864 (“I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a fainthearted originalist.”). More recently, in explaining that he would not undo all precedents
associated with a non-originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, Justice Scalia
proclaimed, “I am a textualist. I am an originalist. I am not a nut.” National Public Radio,
Scalia Vigorously Defends a “Dead” Constitution (Apr. 28, 2008), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=90011526.
139. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 856 (noting that originalism is “not without its warts”).
140. See id. at 856–57 (acknowledging the difficulty of discovering the “original understanding of an ancient text” and noting that such a task is “better suited to the historian
than the lawyer”); see also Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork’s Grand Inquisition, 99 YALE L.J. 1419,
1420 (1990) (criticizing Bork’s originalism on the ground that his constitutional vision is
“radically ahistorical”).
141. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 860 (noting that it might take a longer time and more
pages than are usually available to a judge to flesh out even a minor point “in a fashion that
a serious historian would consider minimally adequate”).
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doing badly.”142 Justice Scalia neglects to explain the context in which
Chesterton wrote. The quotation is from a chapter in Chesterton’s
1910 book, What’s Wrong with the World, in which Chesterton advocated
separate and decidedly distinct education for women.143 One of Chesterton’s themes was the importance of maintaining the distinction between “specialists” and amateurs, or what he calls mankind’s
“comrade-like aspect.”144 He supported an educated amateurism, especially for women,145 but his advice, quoted by Justice Scalia, was
meant to guide people in their pursuit of hobbies, not in their professional lives. As one Chesterton authority put it, Chesterton’s advice
was intended to apply to activities such as “writing one’s own love letters and blowing one’s own nose.”146 More generally, Chesterton
urged people to engage in all sorts of amateurism, as he believed that
an energetic engagement in hobbies and leisure activities were crucial
to being human.147 However, he did not refuse to recognize any social role for the specialist whatsoever; for example, Chesterton would
not have advocated amateurism when it came to playing the organ or
serving as Royal Astronomer.148 In short, Justice Scalia’s adopted
motto does not inspire confidence when applied to a brain surgeon, a
mechanical engineer, or a federal judge. If one cannot have confidence that judges can do a good job of discerning original meaning,
there is no reason to base constitutional interpretation on that hopeless endeavor.
Moreover, Justice Scalia acknowledges that there really is little difference between his “faint-hearted” originalism and non-originalism.149 This is a theme on which critics of originalism have picked
142. Id. at 863.
143. GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE WORLD 314–20 (Dodd, Mead &
Co. 1927) (1910). The passage that Justice Scalia quotes appears on page 320, at the end
of the chapter “Folly and Female Education.” See id. at 314, 320.
144. See id. at 130–31 (citing the “eclipse of comradeship and equality by specialism and
domination” as “the peculiar peril of our time”).
145. See id. at 319–20 (describing the product of his preferred, old-fashioned education
as “maintaining the bold equilibrium of inferiorities which is the most mysterious of superiorities and perhaps the most unattainable”).
146. The American Chesterton Society, Quotemeister, http://chesterton.org/qmeister
2/doingbadly.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
147. See id. (explaining that Chesterton believed some of the most important tasks in life
should be left to amateurs).
148. See id. (observing that “[t]here are things like playing the organ or discovering the
North Pole, or being Astronomer Royal,” which Chesterton would “not want a person to do
at all unless he does them well”).
149. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 862 (acknowledging that “there is really no difference
between the faint-hearted originalist and the moderate nonoriginalist” and that “most
originalists are faint-hearted and most nonoriginalists are moderate”).
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up.150 But it is not clear where this leaves Justice Scalia’s originalism.
He insists that he remains an originalist.151 Yet some originalists
maintain that he is not.152 He certainly invokes originalism when criticizing his fellow Justices’ handling of a particular case, but in Medellı́n,
he blithely signed off on an opinion that was not merely non-originalist but anti-originalist—that is, an opinion willfully blind to the meaning of the Supremacy Clause.
Justice Scalia’s “faint-hearted” version of originalism might permit the type of reasoning followed by the Medellı́n dissent, but because
the majority opinion ignores the strong originalist arguments of the
dissenting Justices, it is hard to see the majority opinion as anything
other than a renunciation of originalism as an approach to the
Supremacy Clause. David Schulz and Christopher Smith argue that,
despite Justice Scalia’s professed originalism, “ideological factors influence how Scalia reads what the framers meant or what he claims
the framers meant.”153 This would seem to be the case in Medellı́n, as
the majority opinion cannot be reconciled with even a faint-hearted
version of originalism.
In any event, the majority opinion cannot be reconciled with the
stricter originalism espoused by Justice Thomas.154 A review of Justice
Thomas’s voting record, however, suggests that he too is less a consistent originalist than he is a consistent conservative.155 The foremost
commentator on Justice Thomas’s version of originalism contends
that Justice Thomas alternates between two versions of originalism

150. Paul Brest, one of the earliest and most effective critics of originalism, echoes Justice Scalia: “The only difference between moderate originalism and nonoriginalist adjudication is one of attitude toward the text and original understanding. For the moderate
originalist, these sources are conclusive when they speak clearly. For the nonoriginalist,
they are important but not determinative.” Brest, supra note 97, at 229.
151. See National Public Radio, supra note 138 (quoting Justice Scalia describing himself
as an originalist and a textualist).
152. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 28, at 13.
153. DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 41 (Gary J. Jacobsohn & Richard E. Morgan eds., 1996).
154. See Christopher E. Smith & Cheryl D. Lema, Justice Clarence Thomas and Incommunicado Detention: Justifications and Risks, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 783, 792 (2005) (“More so than any
other contemporary [J]ustice, Thomas consistently advocates the strict application of key
tools for interpreting the Constitution: its text and history.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
155. See Graber, supra note 106, at 77 (“What unites Thomas’s important concurring
and dissenting opinions in constitutional cases is his commitment to conservative or libertarian results rather than a commitment to any particular theory of the judicial function.”);
Smith & Lema, supra note 154, at 783–84 (characterizing Justice Thomas as one of the
most conservative sitting Justices).
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(which yield different results) depending on the nature of the case.156
It is not at all unusual for the Court’s originalists to let their political
commitments trump those of originalism.157 In fact, the Court’s selfproclaimed originalists are among the most consistently conservative
Supreme Court Justices over the past seventy years.158
And so, Medellı́n is best understood as a political decision rather
than one grounded in either the original meaning of the Supremacy
Clause or even in the meaning of that Clause as reflected in subsequent legal precedent. Indeed, it seems to be a decision that simply
accords with the majority’s skeptical views regarding the extent to
which the United States should be bound by its international commitments.159 As Steve Charnovitz put it, “[a] Court more respectful of
156. See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE
THOMAS 193 (1999) (summarizing Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence as liberal originalism
with respect to civil rights and conservative originalism on civil liberties and federalism).
157. See, e.g., Graber, supra note 106, at 71 (noting that Justice Thomas always sides with
conservative historians whenever there is a disagreement among historians and that he
jettisons originalism entirely when doing so serves conservative interests).
158. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical
Study 46 tbl.3 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper, Paper No.
404, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126403 (ranking Justice Thomas first
and Justice Scalia third among forty-three Justices on the Court from 1937 to 2006 in terms
of their tendency to vote with the more conservative justices in non-unanimous cases); see
also SCHULTZ & SMITH, supra note 153, at xvi (labeling Justice Scalia a “consistent conservative” based on empirical studies of his voting behavior while also noting a handful of cases
in which Scalia surprised observers by siding with the more liberal Justices).
159. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 739
(2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the federal judiciary should not have the
power to create new causes of action for the violation of norms recognized under customary international law); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing the majority’s reliance on “foreign views” as meaningless and dangerous dicta);
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990. n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court[ ] . . .
should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”(citation omitted)).
More generally, Harold Koh has argued that the current court is divided between transnationalist and nationalist judges:
[W]e are now seeing a Supreme Court that is divided between two judicial camps:
the transnationalists and nationalists. . . . What are the key differences between
the judicial philosophies of these two groups?
• Transnationalist judges tend to look to U.S. interdependence, whereas nationalist judges tend to look to U.S. autonomy.
• Transnationalist judges think about how U.S. law fits into a framework of
transnational law, while nationalists see a rigid foreign and domestic divide.
• Transnationalist judges think that courts can domesticate international law,
whereas nationalists think that only the political branches are legally empowered to do so.
• Transnationalist judges look to the development of a global legal system, while
nationalists tend to focus more narrowly on the development of a national
legal system.
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international law might have started with a presumption in favor of
upholding U.S. compliance with ICJ judgments involving U.S. treaty
violations by states.”160 A group of amici encouraged the Court to
adopt such a presumption.161 If the Court had adopted such a standard of review, Charnovitz suggests, the burden would have been
placed on Texas to persuade the Court that its interests ought to take
priority over the national interests at stake in the case.162 Instead, the
Court supplements the President’s power to decide not to comply
with the United States’ international obligations with the power of
states to place the United States in violation of such obligations, even
if the President has made the choice to comply.163
III. MEDELLÍN
CLAUSE

AND THE

ORIGINAL MEANING

OF THE

SUPREMACY

Gordon Wood, recognized as “one of the leading historians of
the early republic,”164 suggests that “most of the means by which we
carry on our governmental business,” such as the cabinet, administrative agencies, the political parties, and judicial review, are “unmentioned in the Constitution and are the products of historical
experience.”165 One would thus expect originalism to apply, if at all,
only in the limited contexts in which the constitutional text in some
•

Transnationalist judges believe that executive power can be constrained by
comity amongst the courts, while nationalists believe acts of executive discretion enjoy great deference.
Harold Hongju Koh, A Community of Reason and Rights, 77 FORDHAM. L. REV. 583, 596
(2008).
160. Steve Charnovitz, Revitalizing the U.S. Compliance Power, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 554
(2008).
161. See id. (citing Brief of International Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 25, Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984)).
162. Id.
163. See id. at 556 (expressing wonder that the Court did not find room within our
constitutional framework for the President to decide either to comply or not to comply).
164. Griffin, supra note 15, at 1206; see also Flaherty, supra note 14, at 2103 n.38 (reporting the results of an unscientific “poll” that found Wood to be the historian most cited in
law reviews); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, Questions for the Critics of Judicial Review,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354, 365 (2003) (heralding Wood as one of two “leading intellectual
historians of the early national period”); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1647 (2002) (listing Wood’s The Creation of the American Republic
1776–1787 (1969) among the leading secondary works on the framing period).
165. GORDON WOOD, THE FUNDAMENTALISTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 13 (Va. Comm’n on
the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution 1988) (1988); see also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 12 tbl.T2
(1999) (listing 87 examples of constitutional “constructions,” that is, processes whereby
our constitutional systems evolves, develops, or takes practical effect through governing
structures and policies without formal amendment judicial constitutional interpretation).
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way establishes or at least delimits the boundaries of our political institutions. From this perspective, originalism may make less (or even less)
sense in the realm of treaty law than it does in other realms of constitutional law.
Very few aspects of the constitutional design with respect to treaties have been realized in our practice. For example, although the
Constitution provides that the President may make a treaty “by and
with” the Senate’s “[a]dvice and [c]onsent,”166 the Senate has not fulfilled its advisory capacity since the time of President Washington.167
More strikingly still, although the Constitution provides only one
mechanism, the Treaty Clause,168 through which the United States
may enter into international agreements, the political branches frequently bypass the rather onerous Article II requirements of advice
and consent by two-thirds of the Senate,169 choosing instead to commit the United States to international agreements through executivelegislative agreements or through sole executive agreements.170 In recent decades, nearly ninety percent of the United States’ international
obligations have arisen through mechanisms other than Article II
treaties.171 Oona Hathaway has recently suggested that the United
States jettisons treaties entirely (or nearly entirely) in favor of the extra-constitutional alternatives, as there is no principled reason for why
our government enters into international obligations through one
method or the other, and congressional-executive agreements are
more likely to achieve adherence.172
Nonetheless, as the dissenting Justices suggest, the Constitution
does provide guidance on the extent to which treaties are supreme
law, enforceable in domestic courts.173 Chief Justice Roberts’s opin166. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
167. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 631, 634 (2004) (noting that the Framers, as well as both the
Senate and the President during Washington’s first administration, understood the Constitution to provide the Senate with advisory power before treaties were finalized); Telman,
supra note 14, at 282 (noting that President Washington originally thought that the Senate
had constitutional power to advise the President on treaty negotiation).
168. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl. 2.
169. Id.
170. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1238 (2008) (noting that the United States
makes binding international agreements through two separate processes, one of which is
laid out in the Constitution and one that is not).
171. Id. at 1258 tbl.1, 1260 tbl.2 (listing by category 375 treaties and 2744 congressionalexecutive agreements entered into by the United States between 1980 and 2000).
172. Id. at 1241 (arguing that “nearly everything that is done through the Treaty Clause
can and should be done through congressional-executive agreements”).
173. See infra Part III.B.
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ion proceeds as if the Constitution were silent on this issue, but as the
concluding section of this Part will show, the original meaning of the
Supremacy Clause strongly favors a presumption in favor of according
treaties the status of supreme, self-executing federal law. The majority’s decision to ignore original meaning in this instance and to favor
state law over the United States’ international obligations raises unnecessary barriers to the conduct of foreign relations by the political
branches of the federal government.
A. The Bases for Chief Justice Roberts’s Opinion in Medellı́n
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in the Medellı́n case has been
widely praised as “careful” and “modest.”174 It is neither. Because the
Court could easily have found that the trial court’s decision dismissing
Medellı́n’s habeas petition on the merits175 complied with the “review
and reconsideration” called for in the Avena decision,176 the petition
for certiorari was improvidently granted. The Medellı́n opinion was
thus offered in violation of the “last resort rule,” according to which “a
federal court should refuse to rule on a constitutional issue if the case
can be resolved on a nonconstitutional basis.”177
In its brief for the Court, the State of Texas urged the Court to
dismiss the case on the basis that the trial court’s finding that Medellı́n had not been prejudiced satisfied the ICJ’s requirement of review
174. See Posting of Paul Stephan to Opinio Juris, http://opiniojuris.org/2008/03/25/
medellin-v-texas-modest-and-fairly-careful/ (Mar. 25, 2008, 2:43 PM EDT) (tentatively concluding that “Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court is modest and fairly careful”); see
also Posting of Julian Ku to Opinio Juris, http://opiniojuris.org/2008/03/25/medellinmy-early-thoughts/ (Mar. 25, 2008, 1:04 PM EDT) (calling the majority opinion “fairly sensible and reasonable”); Posting of Richard Samp to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.
com/wp/medellin-discussion-board-the-court-defers-to-congress/ (Mar. 25, 2008, 5:09 PM)
(discerning a show of humility in the majority’s expressed willingness to defer to Congress
if it were to pass legislation calling for the implementation of Avena); Posting of Kent
Scheidegger to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/medellin-discussion-boardthe-ball-is-in-congresss-court/#more-6908 (Mar. 27, 2008, 4:00 PM) (finding the holding in
Medellı́n “not all that remarkable”).
175. See Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1354–55, n.1 (noting the trial court’s finding
that Medellı́n had not been prejudiced by the United States’ failure to grant him his consular consultation rights under the VCCR because the VCCR only requires notice of such
rights within three days of arrest and Medellı́n had confessed within three hours).
176. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 72–73 (Mar. 31).
177. Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1004
(1994) (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)). Chief Justice Roberts himself recently invoked the doctrine, calling it a “fundamental rule of judicial restraint” and noting that “[o]ur precedents have long counseled
us to avoid deciding . . . hypothetical questions of constitutional law” unless such questions
are unavoidable. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2281–82 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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and reconsideration.178 During oral argument, Justice Kennedy
voiced some sympathy for Texas’s position on this matter.179 Although the ruling of the Texas court is patently absurd, if the Court
agreed that Texas had already granted the necessary review and reconsideration, it should have ruled on that sub-constitutional basis. If
it disagreed, the Court should have taken the opportunity to point out
that, while a criminal defendant who confesses to the police is unlikely
to be acquitted, that confession in no way precludes a well-counseled
defendant from presenting mitigating evidence that would make the
imposition of the death penalty unlikely. Thus, for example, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that Osbaldo
Torres, another Mexican national whose interests were at issue in the
Avena case, suffered prejudice with respect to his capital sentence
even though he was not prejudiced with regard to his conviction for
first-degree murder.180
The opinion is also not modest in that it attempted to resolve
constitutional issues far beyond those necessary to address the facts of
the case. As Steve Charnovitz has argued, “[t]he Court posed too
broad a question”181 for itself in using Medellı́n’s case to establish
blanket rules regarding issues not raised by Medellı́n, including: (1)
the status of ICJ judgments as U.S. law, (2) the President’s power to
refuse to comply with such judgments, and (3) an ICJ decision finding
U.S. federal law to violate a treaty.182 Because it tried to decide hypo178. See Brief for Respondent at 49–50, Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984) (arguing
that the questions presented in the case are moot because the Texas courts already provided the required review under Avena).
179. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984) (“And
I have a problem, incidentally, because I think [Medellı́n] did receive all the hearing that
he’s entitled to under the judgment anyway.”).
180. Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184, 1189–90 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005); see Murphy, supra
note 49, at 261–62 (detailing Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry’s commutation of Torres’s
death sentence and Torres’s unsuccessful attempt to gain further relief from the courts).
181. Charnovitz, supra note 160, at 552.
182. Id. The ambiguity of the majority’s approach in this case is nicely illustrated in its
attempt, in a footnote, to narrow its holding to the facts of Medellı́n. See Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct.
at 1367 n.13 (stating that the Court sought to address only the limited question of whether
the President “may unilaterally create federal law by giving effect to the judgment of this
international tribunal pursuant to this non-self-executing treaty, and, if not, whether he
may rely on other authority under the Constitution to support the action taken in this
particular case”) (emphasis added). Carlos Manuel Vázquez likens this passage to the
Court’s notorious attempt to limit its ruling in Bush v. Gore “to the present circumstances.”
Vázquez, Less than Zero, supra note 12, at 564 (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000)).
While Curtis Bradley has argued that the Medellı́n opinion is susceptible to a narrower
interpretation than most scholars have given it, even he does not view the opinion as limited to its facts, as the majority’s footnote suggests. See Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 541 (2008) (preferring a
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thetical situations not before it, Charnovitz maintains, the Court’s
“reasoning went astray.”183 The specific question posed in Medellı́n
was whether the Avena decision should have been implemented in accordance with the President’s memorandum, and in that regard,
Charnovitz suggests, modesty should have led the Court to defer to
the President, who is “uniquely qualified to [make] sensitive policy
decisions.”184
The substantive portion of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion185 began by acknowledging that Medellı́n relies on the Supremacy
Clause.186 Without any discussion of the founding documents pertaining to the Supremacy Clause or any of the historical scholarship
discussing the original meaning and purpose of the Supremacy
Clause, the Chief Justice proceeded directly to a discussion of the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.187 It is
hard to see what is “careful” about an opinion that interprets a constitutional provision, the Supremacy Clause, without more than a meager reference to it, its legislative history, or the substantial body of
scholarship pertaining to its original meaning. In fact, Chief Justice
Roberts’s Medellı́n opinion ignored the plain meaning of the constitutional text, relied on a few Supreme Court cases while ignoring
others,188 as well as dozens of other federal cases that suggest a presumption in favor of self-execution, and then misapplied the few cases
on which the opinion purportedly relied.189
The doctrine of self-execution is not of constitutional origin.190
narrow interpretation of Medellı́n, according to which non-self-executing treaties are
treated as domestic law but are not judicially enforceable).
183. Charnovitz, supra note 160, at 552.
184. Id. at 556.
185. Part II of the opinion commenced the substantive portion of the opinion in which
Chief Justice Roberts began to set out the applicable substantive U.S. law. Medellı́n, 128 S.
Ct. at 1356–67. Part I of the opinion introduced the relevant treaty law and recite the facts
and procedural history of the case. Id. at 1353–56.
186. Id. at 1356.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 1392–93 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing an appendix listing Supreme
Court cases, most of which were not cited by the majority, in which treaties were held to be
self-executing).
189. See infra notes 241–256 and accompanying text.
190. See Bradley, supra note 182, at 540 (asserting that it has been settled since the Foster
v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), decision that some treaties are non-self-executing
and thus unenforceable unless implemented by Congress); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing
Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 760 (1988) (arguing that the distinction created in case law
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties “is patently inconsistent with express
language” in the Supremacy Clause); Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, supra note 14, at
1233 (characterizing the idea of non-self-executing treaties as “judicially created”). Ac-
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Rather, it is an invention of the Marshall Court.191 The authority
cited in the majority opinion for the doctrine of self-execution consists of several cases,192 one passage from The Federalist Papers,193 and
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States.194 In
explaining its views on the doctrine, the majority noted, in a manner
that neither enlightens nor tends to inspire confidence in the
strength of the precedent on which the Court purported to rely, that
various courts have understood the doctrine of self-execution differently.195 The majority explained that it understood “self-executing” to
cording to Paust, the phrase “self-executing” did not appear in a Supreme Court opinion
until 1887 in Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116 (1887). See Paust, supra, at 766.
191. See Vázquez, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 14, at 700 (explaining that “[t]he distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties was introduced into U.S.
jurisprudence by the Supreme Court in Foster v. Neilson”).
192. See Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1356–57 (majority opinion) (citing Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190 (1888); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Foster v. Neilson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005)
(en banc)).
193. See Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton)). The appeal to the authority of The Federalist Papers is only for Hamilton’s rather
ambiguous comparison between laws that individuals are “‘bound to observe’” as “‘the
supreme law of the land’” and a “‘mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties.’” Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 207 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961)). Since No. 33 deals with the federal government’s taxing power and the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is unclear that it has any relevance to the doctrine of self-execution at all. See THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 203–08 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). In context, it seems that Hamilton’s true purpose is to contrast a law with a mere pact between private parties.
194. See Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 n.3 (citing 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a (1986)).
195. See id. at 1356 n.2 (“The label ‘self-executing’ has on occasion been used to convey
different meanings.”). A more interesting discussion of federal courts’ problematic handling of what it means to call a treaty self-executing or non-self-executing can be found in
scholarly literature. As the dissent notes, at least one scholar has argued that the doctrine
of self-execution is not the best way to explain case law on the judicial enforcement of
treaties. See id. at 1379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the scholarship of Tim Wu); Wu,
supra note 89, at 573–74 (arguing that the best guide to whether a court will enforce a
treaty is the identity of the entity alleged to have violated the treaty and concluding that
courts are most likely to enforce treaties violated by state governments and less likely to
directly enforce treaties violated by Congress); see also Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of SelfExecuting Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 627, 635–42 (1986)
(summarizing differing positions taken by courts and in legal scholarship on the possible
meanings of the doctrine of self-execution); Paust, supra note 190, at 775–81 (criticizing
courts for straying from the original meaning and from Justice Marshall’s method of treaty
interpretation in positing that some treaties must be non-self-executing if their implementation requires an exercise of exclusive congressional power); Carlos Manuel Vázquez,
Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and Presumption of Self-Execution, 122 HARV.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (noting that “self-executing” can mean that a treaty is “addressed to” the legislature, although it could also mean “addressed to” the executive, and
in that case the President’s Memorandum, supra note 4, is adequate execution); Vázquez,
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mean that a “treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon
ratification,”196 but it did not ground its understanding of the doctrine in precedent, history, or logic.197 Instead, relying on a handful
of cases decided over a nearly 175-year span, the Court concluded that
a treaty is only self-executing—that is, that a treaty has domestic effect
as federal law upon ratification—only if it “contains stipulations which
are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make them operative.”198 The Court thus subtly changed the rule laid down by Justice
Marshall which, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, provided that
treaties are presumed to be self-executing unless the parties to the
treaty stipulate otherwise199 into a presumption against self-execution
absent a contrary provision.200
Having established the status of treaties as domestic law without
any analysis of the Supremacy Clause, the Chief Justice then proSelf-Executing Treaties, supra note 14, at 696–97 (identifying four distinct grounds on which a
court might conclude that legislative action is necessary before it can enforce a treaty).
196. Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1356 n.2 (majority opinion).
197. Curtis Bradley notes that “[t]he opinion leaves unclear . . . whether a non-selfexecuting treaty is simply judicially unenforceable, or whether it more broadly lacks the
status of domestic law.” Bradley, supra note 182, at 548.
198. Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888)). Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent that it is absurd to expect a multilateral
treaty to address the issue of self-execution, as some States automatically incorporate treaties into domestic law. See id. at 1381, 1383 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing the Netherlands
as an example of a State that directly incorporates treaties into domestic law without explicit legislative approval); see also Bradley, supra note 182, at 544 (noting that “self-execution is rarely the subject of negotiation”); Iwasawa, supra note 195, at 654 (noting that
parties negotiating a treaty rarely concern themselves with the treaty’s domestic validity
and thus it is “very rare” to find a treaty—especially a multilateral treaty—that indicates
whether it is to be self-executing); Paust, supra note 190, at 770–71 (criticizing Justice Marshall’s approach to the question of the domestic effect of treaties given that parties to a
treaty “rarely concern themselves with the details of domestic implementation”); Vázquez,
Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 14, at 709 (“Perhaps because of the diversity of domesticlaw rules on the subject, nations negotiating treaties rarely address matters of domestic
implementation.”).
199. See United States v. Perchemen, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88–89 (1833) (finding a treaty
self-executing where it does not stipulate to the need for some future legislative act).
200. See David J. Bederman, Medellı́n’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM. J.
INT’L L. 529, 529 (2008) (noting that scholarly attention regarding the Medellı́n opinion
had focused on “the Court’s supposed ruling as to the presumptive non-self-execution of
international agreements entered into by the United States”); Julian G. Ku, Medellı́n’s
Clear Statement Rule: A Solution for International Delegations, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 615
(2008) (acknowledging that Medellı́n might well be criticized for “departing from existing
understandings of the non-self-execution doctrine and imposing a new clear statement
requirement”). But see Bradley, supra note 182, at 541 (suggesting that Medellı́n is best
understood as requiring a treaty-by-treaty approach to the question of self-execution without resort to a general presumption); Vázquez, Less Than Zero, supra note 12, at 570 (noting
several statements in the majority opinion suggesting that treaties are presumptively nonself-executing).
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ceeded to a discussion of the treaties at issue. The Optional Protocol,
he concluded, is a “bare grant of jurisdiction” which “does not itself
commit signatories to comply with an ICJ judgment.”201 The key language of the U.N. Charter provides that each member “undertakes to
comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a
party.”202 Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that this provision cannot be
self-executing because the “sole remedy for noncompliance” provided
by the Charter is “referral to the United Nations Security Council by
an aggrieved state.”203
The Chief Justice also found some support for this reading of the
U.N. Charter in the Senate hearings on the ratification of the Charter,
and he treated that evidence as decisive.204 Reliance on such unilateral statements is not called for under the Supreme Court precedents

201. Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1358 (majority opinion).
202. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.
203. Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1359 (emphasis added) (citing U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2).
Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, made the obvious point that there is nothing in the language of the Charter to suggest that the political remedy is the sole remedy. See id. at 1385
(Breyer, J., dissenting). On the contrary, the political remedy is an extraordinary remedy,
since it was the expectation of the framers of the Charter that States would comply with ICJ
decisions, and that expectation has been largely realized. See Jordan J. Paust, Medellı́n,
Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant Executive Authority, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 301, 303–04 n.7 (2008) (describing Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter as creating an
additional enforcement option, which has never been used and which in any case does not
render an ICJ judgment any less binding); Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 331, 378 (2008) (“[W]hile Article 94(2) also provides for possible referral
to the Security Council in the event of noncompliance, this scarcely detracts from the
international legal obligation to comply.”).
204. The majority opinion first cited to a statement made in the hearings of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations to the effect that “‘[i]f a state fails to perform its obligations under a judgment of the ICJ, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council.’” Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1359 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting The
Charter of the United Nations for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Hearings
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong. 124–25 (1945)). The phrase “may have
recourse” hardly suggests an exclusive remedy. The majority opinion then cited to statements of Leo Paslovsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for International Organizations and Security Affairs, id., and Charles Fahy, Legal Advisor to the State Department,
id. at 1359–60. Paslovsky recognized that a state’s refusal to implement a decision of the
ICJ creates a political rather than a legal dispute. Id. at 1359. Such a statement is not in
the least surprising, since the Security Council is a political body. In the statements quoted
by the majority, Paslovsky said nothing about the exclusivity of the remedy. See id. Fahy
stated that parties accepting ICJ jurisdiction have a moral obligation to comply with ICJ
decisions and that Article 94(2) provides the exclusive means of enforcement of such decisions. Id. at 1359–60. There is no disputing the accuracy of Fahy’s statement as a matter of
international law. It is very difficult to see why it is relevant to the question of whether ICJ
decisions are enforceable as domestic law. As Justice Breyer points out, one would not
expect the U.N. Charter, or any international agreement, to specify the status of its provisions as a matter of domestic law. Id. at 1381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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on which Chief Justice Roberts relied, specifically Foster v. Neilson205
and U.S. v. Percheman,206 as those cases seem to stand for the principle
that treaties are considered self-executing unless the parties to the treaties intend otherwise.207
There is more than a little irony in Chief Justice Roberts’s argument that the U.N. Charter cannot be treated as self-executing absent
clearer language in the treaty or the legislative history behind its ratification. Foreign relations, the Chief Justice reminded us, is committed
by the Constitution to the political departments.208 If we were to treat
the Charter as self-executing, that “would eliminate the option of noncompliance contemplated by Article 94(2), undermining the ability of
the political branches to determine whether and how to comply with
an ICJ judgment.”209 But in this case, the President had determined
how to comply with the ICJ judgment. He directed state courts to
implement the Avena decision.210 The other political branch was silent. The effect of the majority opinion in Medellı́n is to prevent the
Executive branch from conducting foreign policy (even where it faces
no political opposition at the federal level) by complying with an international court’s decision and to entrust control over U.S. foreign
relations to the courts of the State of Texas. As we shall see in Part
III.B., this is precisely the result the Framers sought to avoid through
the Supremacy Clause.
Chief Justice Roberts proceeded to defend his interpretive approach as rooted in two cases from the early Republic, Foster and
Percheman.211 The dissent characterized that approach as “look[ing]
for the wrong thing (explicit textual expression about self-execution)
using the wrong standard (clarity) in the wrong place (the treaty language).”212 The Chief Justice accepted this characterization,213 but
said little in its defense beyond the paltry citations to authority already
205. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
206. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
207. See Vázquez, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 14, at 706–08 (arguing that permitting
the United States to determine unilaterally whether a treaty is self-executing is inconsistent
with the Supremacy Clause as interpreted in Foster and Percheman). David Bederman nonetheless sees the Medellı́n opinion as a step in the direction of compliance with international
expectations for the proper approach to treaty interpretation. See Bederman, supra note
200, at 531 (citing Justice Roberts’s opinion as making “a new readiness to accept eclecticism in the selection of materials relevant to a treaty’s interpretation”).
208. Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1360 (majority opinion).
209. Id.
210. President’s Memorandum, supra note 4.
211. Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1362.
212. Id. at 1389 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
213. See id. at 1362 (majority opinion) (“[W]e have to confess that we do think it rather
important to look to the treaty language to see what it has to say about the issue.”).
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indicated. Nor did the majority respond to the dissent’s arguments
that courts have routinely found treaties to be self-executing despite
the lack of a clear statement that no further legislative action was required.214 As Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion named only one
ratified and one un-ratified treaty that would pass the majority’s clear
statement rule,215 it is obvious that the majority’s clear statement standard has never been the operative test for self-execution under U.S.
law.216 The majority opinion nevertheless rejected the dissent’s far
more traditional approach to the issue of self-execution on the
ground that it was “arrestingly indeterminate.”217
This is a baffling verdict. The majority opinion is completely untethered to any constitutional authority; it meanders across two centuries of legal opinions and plucks out a handful of cases that do not
even support its interpretive approach, and then it briefly visits the
relevant treaty texts218 before rifling through the relevant ratification
history to highlight a few perhaps helpful quotations. How this approach is any more determinate than the dissent’s traditional deference to the Supremacy Clause is hard to fathom.219
214. Id. at 1380–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority fails to “point to a
single ratified United States treaty that contains the kind of ‘clear’ or ‘plain’ textual indication” for which the majority now requires).
215. See id. at 1373 & n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
216. See id. at 1381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority’s clear statement
requirement cannot be the proper standard given that only a few treaties “actually do speak
clearly” on the matter of self-execution).
217. Id. at 1362 (majority opinion).
218. The majority’s approach to treaty interpretation, which paid no attention to the
object and purpose of the treaty or to its drafting history, is inconsistent with both international and domestic law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose.”); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 402–03 (1985) (incorporating
an analysis of the drafting history of the Warsaw Convention in interpreting the treaty’s
text). The majority cited to Air France for the principle that “[t]he interpretation of a
treaty . . . begins with its text” and also noted cases in which the Court had also considered
“the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as ‘the postratification understanding’ of signatory nations.” Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 (quoting Zicherman v. Korean
Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)). However, the majority included only the most
limited discussion of the negotiation and drafting history of the relevant treaties and limited its inquiry into the “postratification understanding” of those treaties to that of the
United States. See id. at 1357–61 (discussing treaty interpretation). Moreover, Jordan
Paust suggests that the majority ignored evidence that the VCCR is self-executing. Paust,
supra note 203, at 306 n.15 (citing numerous authorities in support of the claim that the
United States considers the VCCR self-executing and supreme federal law); see also Breard
v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring) (stating that the
VCCR is self-executing).
219. Curtis Bradley, in arguing that the opinion does not have the extreme character
that its critics allege, suggests that it merely requires a treaty-by-treaty analysis of whether
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In fact, the majority opinion may compound indeterminacy with
incoherence. On the one hand, the Court seemed to favor a textual
approach that decides whether or not a treaty is self-executing based
on the language of the treaty and its U.S. ratifiers. On the other
hand, it suggested that post-ratification is also relevant.
Logically, the Court cannot have it both ways. Either a U.S.
treaty is immutably self-executing (or not) at its birth, or
there is a possibility that the status of a treaty can evolve over
time . . . . Because the Court acknowledged postratification
practice to be relevant to a treaty’s status in U.S. law, one
cannot read Medellı́n as saying that the meaning of Article
94(1) [of the U.N. Charter] was frozen by the expectations
held by the [P]resident and the Senate in 1945.220
The decision calls into doubt the enforceability of innumerable treaties, as evidenced by a decision of the American Bar Association and
the American Society of International Law to form a joint task force to
evaluate the efficacy of U.S. treaties as a matter of domestic law in the
aftermath of Medellı́n.221 Justice Breyer is simply correct to point out
that the majority opinion “erects legalistic hurdles that can threaten
the application of provisions in many existing commercial and other
treaties and make it more difficult to negotiate new ones.”222
B. The Supremacy Clause and the Doctrine of Self-Execution
Justice Breyer, writing in dissent in Medellı́n, identified the issue
in that case as whether or not “an ICJ judgment rendered pursuant to
the parties’ consent to compulsory ICJ jurisdiction . . . automatically
become[s] part of our domestic law.”223 Unlike the majority, Justice
Breyer concluded that the issue cannot be answered by looking to the
the drafters or ratifiers intended it to be self-executing. Bradley, supra note 182, at 541. If
this is really what Medellı́n stands for, then it is highly indeterminate and provides very little
guidance to lower courts. Moreover, Bradley points out that the majority opinion is unclear on its own methodology for determining whether or not a treaty is self-executing.
Despite statements indicating that courts should look only to what the United States intended regarding self-execution, id. at 544 (citing Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1364, 1366, 1367),
Bradley notes that the Court also seemed willing to consider evidence relating to the intent
of all treaty parties, their postratification understandings, and perhaps even the views of
the ICJ on self-execution. Id. (citing Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1361 n.9).
220. Charnovitz, supra note 160, at 555.
221. The formation of this Task Force was announced in a press release. See Press Release, Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law and Am. Bar Ass’n, Joint Task Force on Treaties in U. S. Law,
available at http://law.anu.edu.au/news/webdocuments/taskforceterms.pdf (last visited
Feb. 13, 2009).
222. Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1381–82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 1377.
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language of the treaties at issue.224 Rather, the issue must be resolved
as a matter of domestic law, with reference to early cases, decided by
“Justices well aware of the Founders’ original intent” in adopting the
Supremacy Clause.225 Based on an abbreviated discussion of those
cases and guided by the relevant scholarship,226 Justice Breyer concluded that the ICJ’s Avena judgment “is enforceable as a matter of
domestic law without further legislation.”227 That conclusion is less
significant to us than is the scholarship on the original meaning of the
Supremacy Clause that Justice Breyer summarized and the Chief Justice ignored. What follows is an expanded summary of the scholarship invoked by the dissenting Justices, supplemented with additional
scholarship not referenced in the Medellı́n opinions. It is striking that
none of this background, relevant to the original meaning of the
Supremacy Clause, informed the majority opinion. Even the dissent
provided only a hint of the vast evidence suggesting that the original
intent and meaning of the Supremacy Clause was to create a presumption in favor of self-execution.
The purpose of the Supremacy Clause was to prevent U.S. treaty
violations “by empowering the courts to enforce treaties at the behest
of affected individuals without awaiting authorization from state or
federal legislatures.”228 This presumption of self-execution, though
limited,229 was in marked contrast, in the Framers’ view, to the laws of
England230 and to the laws of the American colonies under the Arti-

224. See id. (stating that the majority opinion “places too much weight upon treaty
language”).
225. Id.
226. See id. at 1377–80 (discussing Supreme Court case law “stretching back 200 years” to
determine the Founders’ original intent in adopting the Supremacy Clause and considering relevant scholarship).
227. Id. at 1377.
228. Vázquez, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 14, at 696.
229. See id. at 696–97 (identifying four grounds on which a court might conclude legitimately that a treaty required legislative action for enforcement).
230. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 275–76 (1796) (explaining that Great Britain requires legislative effectuation of treaty provisions and observing that the British have
“constantly observed” this requirement); see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254
(1829) (contrasting the general rule of international law regarding treaties, whereby treaties are not automatically domestic law, with the “different principle” announced under
the Supremacy Clause); Vázquez, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 14, at 697 & n.12 (stating
that under the fundamental law of Great Britain, treaties were non-self-executing except
that admiralty and prize courts were empowered to give direct effect to the laws of nations,
including treaties). Martin Flaherty points out that the Framers may have been incorrect
in their assumption that treaties were presumptively non-self-executing under the laws of
England. Flaherty, supra note 14, at 2112.
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cles of Confederation.231 The Supremacy Clause embodied the Framers’ response to the more general problem of enforcing federal law.232
The Framers adopted the more radical language of the New Jersey
plan, declaring treaties to be “the supreme Law of the Land,” rather
than giving Congress the power to “negative” state legislation as proposed in the rival Virginia Plan, thus incorporating U.S. treaties
into domestic law with no requirement for congressional
implementation.233
As Justice Breyer noted,234 James Madison explained that the
Supremacy Clause was necessary to prevent the federal government
from being embarrassed by state regulation that substantially frustrated the government’s ability to comply with treaty obligations, as
had occurred under the Articles of Confederation.235 Numerous
statements by other Framers support Madison’s view of the purpose
and meaning of the Supremacy Clause. For example, as early as 1786,
John Jay advocated for a rule prohibiting state legislatures from passing acts that would restrain, limit, or counteract the operation or execution of a treaty.236 James Iredell, a member of the North Carolina
ratifying convention237 and therefore a person whose views a textualist
originalist should be interested in,238 similarly viewed a treaty as “law
of the land,” and binding upon the people.239 In South Carolina,
231. See Vázquez, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 14, at 698 (noting the “widespread
understanding” that treaties concluded by the Continental Congress were not enforceable
in state courts in the face of conflicting legislation and the federal government’s lack of a
mechanism for making state courts enforce treaties).
232. See id. (calling this problem the “principal reason for the Framers’ decision to draft
a new constitution rather than amend the Articles” of Confederation).
233. Id. at 698–99.
234. Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1378 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
235. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 277 (noting that the Supremacy Clause was passed to prevent
states from ignoring treaty obligations, a “difficulty, which every one knows had been the
means of greatly distressing the Union, and injuring its public credit”).
236. See 1 CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
268–75 n.4 (1902) (excerpting John Jay’s Oct. 13, 1786 report to Congress, which maintained that state legislatures cannot pass laws “interpreting, explaining or construing a
national treaty,” or otherwise limiting the operation of a treaty); see also Paust, supra note
190, at 760–61, 760 n.3 (remarking that Congress unanimously adopted Jay’s report, reflecting the expectation that treaties would be supreme law, and that Jay made similar
remarks after becoming Chief Justice of the Supreme Court).
237. Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1378.
238. See YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 14, at 27–28 (arguing that the
views of the Constitution’s ratifiers are the most important, since the ratifiers bound the
people they represented through their votes and therefore their understanding of the document is the most relevant original meaning).
239. Paust, supra note 190, at 761; see also id. at 761 n.9 (noting that Iredell, like Chief
Justice Jay, made similar comments after becoming a Justice of the Supreme Court).
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both John Rutledge and Charles Pinckney stated their views that treaties were “paramount” laws.240 Not surprisingly, these views are consistent with the express language of the Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause, which declares treaties to be supreme federal law and operative notwithstanding any contrary state law.241
Early Supreme Court decisions are also consistent with the express language of the Supremacy Clause.242 In Ware v. Hylton,243 for
example, a British creditor sought payment of an American citizen’s
Revolutionary War debt pursuant to the 1783 Paris Peace Treaty.244
The debtor claimed that he had paid the debt by paying the money
owed into a Virginia state fund in accordance with Virginia law.245
Each Justice wrote separately in the case, but all agreed that the Virginia statute was invalid.246 In his Medellı́n dissent, Justice Breyer appropriately focused on the opinion of Justice Iredell,247 which
distinguished between portions of the treaty that had been “executed”
and those which were “executory.”248 Justice Iredell defined “executed” as treaty provisions that “from the nature of them . . . require
no further act to be done.”249 Executory provisions are addressed to a
branch of the federal government because “when a nation promises to
do a thing, it is to be understood, that this promise is to be carried
into execution, in the manner which the [C]onstitution of that nation
prescribes.”250 Justice Iredell therefore suggested that treaties that
“prescribe laws to the people for their obedience” must be implemented through legislative action.251 But Justice Iredell then further
explained that after the passage of the Constitution, if a treaty is constitutional, “it is also, by the vigor of its own authority, to be executed
in fact.”252 In short, Justice Iredell rejected the notion that, after the

240. Id. at 763.
241. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
242. See Paust, supra note 190, at 765 & n.36 (listing ten cases decided between 1794 and
1825 in which “treaty law was accepted as operating . . . as supreme federal law in the face
of inconsistent state law”).
243. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
244. Id. at 203–04.
245. Id. at 220–21.
246. Id. at 285.
247. Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1378 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
248. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 272.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 277.
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Supremacy Clause, there can be any talk of non-self-executing treaty
provisions.253
In its first case expressly addressing the issue, the Marshall Court
recognized that, while treaties are generally viewed as a contract between two states requiring execution by the sovereign power of both
states, “[i]n the United States a different principle is established” according to which treaties are to be regarded as equivalent to acts of
the legislature, so long as the treaty can “operate[ ] of itself without
the aid of any legislative provision.”254 This notion of treaties that operate by themselves is the source of the doctrine of self-execution.255
But when does a treaty operate of itself? Carlos Vázquez contends that
the effect of the “principle” established under the Supremacy Clause
is to create a presumption in favor of self-execution, unless the parties
make a contrary intent clear through treaty language.256 Justice
Breyer’s dissenting opinion accepts that presumption, providing that
a treaty is self-executing “unless it specifically contemplates execution
by the legislature and thereby ‘addresses itself to the political, not the
judicial department.’”257 This suggests that, contrary to the majority’s
approach, the question of whether or not a treaty requires legislative
action before it can be binding domestic law enforceable in U.S.
courts should turn on the intent of the parties to the treaty.
The rules under international law for determining the intent of
the parties to an international agreement are set forth in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLoT”).258 Although the
United States has not ratified the VCLoT, it is generally recognized as

253. Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion loses sight of this dynamic in Justice Iredell’s
Ware opinion when Justice Breyer relies on that opinion to suggest that courts must determine whether a treaty addresses itself to the political branches for further action. Medellı́n
v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1382 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Iredell’s position,
even as Justice Breyer himself presents it, is that the question of whether or not a treaty
addresses itself to a particular department of the government is rendered moot by the
Supremacy Clause.
254. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
255. Vázquez, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 14, at 701.
256. Id. at 703; see also id. (suggesting that parties can alter the rule in favor of selfexecution by providing in the treaty that rights and liabilities of individuals arising from
the treaty will be established though subsequent legislative acts).
257. Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1379 (quoting Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 254). Justice Breyer
also noted Justice Baldwin’s remark that “‘it would be a bold proposition’ to assert ‘that an
act of Congress must be first passed’ in order to give a treaty effect as ‘a supreme law of the
land.’” Id. at 1379 (quoting Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353, 388
(1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring)).
258. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 218.
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embodying principles of customary international law,259 which are
binding on the United States.260 Both the U.S. Department of State261
and federal courts have recognized that the VCLoT codifies customary international law.262 Courts have repeatedly recognized its authority as embodying customary international law with respect to treaty
interpretation specifically.263
The VCLoT provides that a treaty must be “interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.”264 Included in the VCLoT’s conception of “context” are
the text of the treaty, including any preambles or annexes,265 any related agreements,266 or related instruments.267 In addition, in interpreting a treaty, an adjudicatory body must take into account
259. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 811, 811 n.3 (5th ed. 2003) (citing ICJ
cases recognizing VCLoT as reflecting customary international law).
260. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728–29 (2004) (recognizing that violations of customary international law are enforceable in U.S. courts without the need for
congressional action); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination.”).
261. See Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States
Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 298 (1988) (citing Robert Dalton, Assistant Legal Advisor for
Treaty Affairs within the Department of State, who said that the U.S. relied on VCLoT for
dealing with many day-to-day treaty problems, and Secretary of State Rogers’ report to the
President, characterizing VCLoT as “‘the authoritative guide to current treaty law and
practice’” (quoting Report from William P. Rogers, Sec’y of State, to the President (Oct.
18, 1971), in DEP’T ST. BULL., Dec. 1971, at 685)).
262. See Avero Belg. Ins. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2005) (relying on
VCLoT as an “authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties”); Chubb &
Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 2000) (characterizing VCLoT as a
restatement of customary rules which bind States whether or not they are parties to the
treaty); Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1296 n.40
(11th Cir. 1999) (“Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it
regards the substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention as codifying the international
law of treaties.”); see also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 n.5 (1982) (referring to
VCLoT as a principle of international law).
263. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191–92 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citing Article 31(1) of VCLoT for the “well settled” proposition that a treaty
must be construed according to its ordinary meaning); Tseng v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 122
F.3d 99, 104–05 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Articles 31 and 32 as embodying customary international law), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 155 (1999); see also SHAW, supra note 259, at 811
& n.4 (citing numerous international tribunals that have recognized the authority of
VCLoT’s rules for interpretation of treaties).
264. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 218, art. 31(1).
265. Id. art. 31(2).
266. Id. art. 31(2)(a).
267. Id. art. 31(2)(b).
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subsequent agreements268 and practice,269 as well as relevant rules of
international law.270 In case the interpretation arrived at through this
method is ambiguous or obscure,271 or manifestly unreasonable,272
that interpretation may be confirmed, or the meaning may be determined through the use of supplementary materials, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its drafting.273
In Air France v. Saks,274 the Supreme Court interpreted the Warsaw Convention on International Air Transport275 in a manner consistent with the VCLoT. The Court began with a thorough investigation
of the relevant provisions of the Convention in both English276 and
French,277 the language of their drafting, as required under the
VCLoT.278 The Court then proceeded to a discussion of the negotiating history of the relevant provisions279 and the conduct of the parties
to the Convention with respect to those provisions, which also entailed a discussion of the parties’ subsequent interpretations of the
provisions.280 Finally, the Court consulted subsequent agreements
among the parties to determine if those agreements indicated an intention to depart from the original meaning of the Convention.281 In
Medellı́n, neither the majority nor the dissent engage in this sort of
careful assessment of the intended meaning of the treaties at issue.
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion in Medellı́n are
exemplary in terms of their adherence to the generally recognized
rules for treaty interpretation.282 Neither opinion looks at the exten268. Id. art. 31(3)(a).
269. Id. art. 31(3)(b).
270. Id. art. 31(3)(c).
271. Id. art. 32(a).
272. Id. art. 32(b).
273. Id. art. 32.
274. 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
275. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
276. Air France, 470 U.S. at 397–99.
277. Id. at 397–400 & n.2.
278. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 218, art. 33(1) (stating
that “[w]hen a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally
authoritative in each language,” unless the treaty provides that a particular language
prevails in the event of divergence).
279. Air France, 470 U.S. at 400–03.
280. Id. at 403–05.
281. Id. at 406–07.
282. See Bradley, supra note 182, at 540 (“The Court employed a text-centered approach
to self-execution and rejected a multifactored balancing analysis similar to one that had
been adopted by some lower courts.”). David Bederman views the majority opinion in
Medellı́n as something of a departure, at least for Justices Scalia and Thomas, from the
purely textualist approach to treaty interpretation that they formerly favored as more “con-
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sive travaux préparatoire relating to the U.N. Charter.283 Perhaps conceding that this is the sort of activity worth doing only if it can be done
well, none of the Justices make much of an effort to discern the object
and purpose of the relevant treaties. Still, the dissent does a far better
job of considering the original meaning of the relevant constitutional
provision and its role in our constitutional history.
Although the Justices who joined the majority opinion prefer to
ride under the banners of originalism and judicial restraint, the Medellı́n majority’s position betrays both of those causes. The majority pays
no attention to the original meaning of the Supremacy Clause, and it
frustrates the federal executive by thwarting its attempt to comply with
an international obligation. Instead, the majority permits the courts
of the State of Texas to place the United States in violation of an international judgment with which the federal government sought to
comply.
IV. WHAT REMAINS
Medellı́n’s case never should have come before the Supreme
Court. President Bush intervened in Medellı́n’s case in what turned
out to be a failed attempt to comply with an international judgment,
in keeping with the United States’ international obligations and the
President’s understanding of his constitutional authority over foreign
affairs. This Part argues that the President’s efforts were unsuccessful
because they were half-measures.284 The President has a duty to “take
sistent with those Justices’ views about the proper modalities for statutory construction.”
Bederman, supra note 200, at 530. As Bederman sees it, the readiness expressed in Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion to consider extra-textual sources as “aids to interpretation,” Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357–58 (2008), establishes something of a consensus on
the Court in favor of a more open-ended and inclusive approach to treaty interpretation.
See Bederman, supra note 200, at 530–31 (calling Medellı́n the “final curtain” and “an armistice of sorts” in the Justices’ running debate over the past two decades on treaty interpretation). I do not share Bederman’s optimism that Medellı́n settles things, especially since, as I
have indicated above, see supra note 194 and accompanying text, the Medellı́n majority’s use
of extra-textual sources in construing the relevant treaties is both limited and highly selective. Bederman himself concludes that the Medellı́n majority’s approach may be viewed “as
a cramped and unreflective version of the VCL[o]T’s full-throated recognition of treaty
text, not only in the specific context of related treaty provisions, but also in light of the
‘object and purpose’ of the instrument.” Bederman, supra note 200, at 534. Moreover, I
agree with Bederman that the Medellı́n decision “does relatively little to articulate clear
canons of construction” for treaty interpretation. Id. at 530. Although Bederman hopes
the case resolves a tension in the Court’s approach to treaty interpretation, the Justices
have left themselves room to backslide into textualism. See id. at 539 (noting that Medellı́n
might become the “exception that . . . proves the rule”).
283. See Bederman, supra note 200 at 536–37.
284. See Swaine, supra note 203, at 372 (noting that the Bush Administration “purport[ed] to implement Avena” while also claiming that doing so is optional and that the
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Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”285 This Part will develop
an argument for how the President, pursuant to the obligations attendant to the Take Care Clause, can take effective action to prevent
cases such as Medellı́n from arising.
Some have argued that the Take Care Clause mandates that
“[t]he President should be able to do what is necessary to execute the
supreme law of the land by overriding a state law or procedure that, if
carried out, would cause the United States to violate the treaty.”286 In
its strongest form, this reading of the Take Care Clause would support
the view that the President’s memorandum ordering states to implement the Avena decision should be given the force of law.287 One
need not go so far. The Court has not ruled on whether the Take
Care Clause empowers the President to override state law.288 However,
even if the President acting alone could not override state law, the
Take Care Clause still gives rise to a constitutional duty for the President to work with Congress to override state law that could place the
United States in violation of its international obligations.
In the case of the Avena judgment, and more generally with respect to the United States’ obligations under the VCCR’s Article 36,
successive U.S. Presidents have failed to abide by such a duty. This
Part thus concludes with a brief discussion of the U.S. executive’s ongoing failure to take care that the ICJ’s Avena decision is implemented
ICJ decision misreads the VCCR). John Cerone has neatly expressed the peculiarity of the
Bush Administration’s actions:
U.S. President George W. Bush has intervened (1) on behalf of a (non-whitecollar) criminal defendant, (2) in a death penalty case, (3) in Texas, (4) invoking
principles of comity, (5) with reference to an international legal obligation o[f]
the United States, (6) as determined by an international court, (7) in a judgment
that penetrates deeply into the domestic criminal justice system, (8) of Texas.
What’s not wrong with this picture?
John Cerone, Making Sense of the U.S. President’s Intervention in Medellı́n, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 279, 279 (2008).
285. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
286. Frederic L. Kirgis, International Law in the American Courts—The United States Supreme
Court Declines to Enforce the I.C.J.’s Avena Judgment Relating to a U.S. Obligation Under the Convention on Consular Relations, 9 GERM. L.J. 619, 631 (2008).
287. Not surprisingly, Medellı́n’s attorneys made this argument in their opening brief in
the Supreme Court. See Brief for Petitioner at 17, Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008)
(No. 06-984) (“Both historical practice and this Court’s decisions make clear that this authority affords the President discretion to determine the means of enforcement of statutes
and treaties to the extent not specified by Congress or the treaty, and to take such other
steps as may be necessary to ensure that the powers that the Constitution gives to the
federal government can be carried into effect.”).
288. See Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1372 (finding that the Take Care Clause “allows the President to execute the laws, not make them”).
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as required under both international and domestic law pursuant to
Article 94 of the U.N. Charter.
A.

Implementing Treaties Through the Take Care Clause

Medellı́n and his amici were loathe to rely on the Take Care
Clause in arguing that President Bush had constitutional power to direct state courts to implement the Avena judgment.289 That was likely
an appropriate decision for litigation purposes, since the powers associated with the Take Care Clause have not been well-established in the
case law.290 But there are relatively simple measures that the President can take, in accordance with the executive’s constitutional powers, to ensure U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations.
The President’s duty under the Take Care Clause requires that
the executive branch draft whatever legislation is necessary to implement all treaty obligations to the extent that those obligations are not
self-executing. Before elaborating on this thesis, however, we must
first entertain a few objections to this reading of the Take Care Clause.
First, there is some controversy over whether the Take Care
Clause, which refers to “the Laws” and does not mention treaties, entails a duty of the President to faithfully execute treaties.291 Still, the
overwhelming majority of scholars who have touched on the issue
have concluded that the Framers intended to include both congressional laws and treaties in “the Laws” to be executed under the Take
Care Clause.292 Whatever the views of the Framers, the Supreme
Court has generally taken the position that “the Laws” encompassed
within the Take Care Clause include treaties.293 Specifically, the
289. See Swaine, supra note 203, at 341 (noting that the Take Care Clause plays a “bit
part in debates over presidential authority” and that Medellı́n considered reliance on the
Take Care Clause unnecessary “in light of the President’s broad, well-established foreign
affairs powers”).
290. See id. at 335 (noting that reliance on the Take Care Clause has “fallen out of
favor”).
291. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 203 (1990) (contending that
the Take Care Clause only applies to laws enacted by the legislature); Swaine, supra note
203, at 343 (conceding that the question of treaties’ statuses under the Take Care Clause
are “not free from doubt”).
292. See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 154–60 (2004) (explaining that the Take Care Clause entails a presidential duty to execute treaties); Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, supra note 14, at 1232
(finding no textual or historical basis for the claim that the Take Care Clause applies only
to statutes); Swaine, supra note 203, at 343–46 (assembling key statements from the Framers expressing the view that the President’s Take Care duties include a duty to execute
treaties).
293. Swaine, supra note 203, at 347.
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Court endorsed this view in In re Neagle294 and again in United States v.
Midwest Oil Co.295 Indeed, even the boldest advocates of unilateral executive authority concede that the President may not refuse to enforce a treaty in force because to do so would violate the Take Care
Clause.296
Next, some have argued that because non-self-executing treaties
are not supreme law, they are excluded from the ambit of the Take
Care Clause.297 Rather, non-self-executing treaties are to be executed
by Congress, thus relieving the President of his take care duties.298
The claim is a peculiar one, given the widely acknowledged confusion
regarding what constitutes a non-self-executing treaty.299 Moreover,
since the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties is not of constitutional origin,300 it is hard to use that distinction as a means of specifying the ambit of the Take Care Clause. One
way to reconcile the constitutional text, which states that all treaties
are supreme law, with our practice, in which non-self-executing treaties are not given effect as supreme law, is to characterize non-selfexecuting treaties as non-justiciable—that is, supreme law but, until
executed, not a source of judicially enforceable rights.301 This is an

294. See 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890) (implying through a rhetorical question that the duties
arising from the Take Care Clause entail “the rights, duties and obligations growing out of
the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the
nature of the government under the Constitution”).
295. See 236 U.S. 459, 505 (1915) (Day, McKenna, and Van Devanter, JJ., dissenting)
(stating that the President’s duties under the Take Care Clause entail “the rights and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
296. See Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, to Hon. William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State 4–5 (Jan. 14, 2002), available at http://www.cartoonbank.com/
newyorker/slideshows/02YooTaft.pdf (“While it might be convenient for the President to
decide to enforce parts of a treaty but not others, it would not be fully in keeping with his
constitutional responsibilities.”).
297. See, e.g., Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116
YALE L.J. 1230, 1261 (2007) (contending that the President has no duty to take care that
non-self-executing treaties are faithfully executed); Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 334 (2006) (“If a particular
treaty does not create of its own force a directly cognizable federal law right, obligation, or
power, there is nothing—at least not yet—for the president to ‘execute’ under the Take
Care Clause.”).
298. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, supra note 14, at 1232.
299. See supra note 195.
300. See supra note 190.
301. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, supra note 14, at 1233.
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elegant solution, but it turns on agreement on the meaning of “nonself-executing,” and no such agreement exists.302
These objections are not huge impediments to this Article’s argument. Those who take issue with the President’s power to take care
that a non-self-executing treaty is faithfully executed have in mind a
positive power to execute the laws.303 Here, we are only concerned
with a presidential duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. For our purposes, there is no need to show that the President
could, through the exercise of some variety of Article II power, give
domestic effect to a non-self-executing treaty. It is enough if the Take
Care Clause mandates that the President undertake whatever legal or
political measures are needed to effectuate such treaties as domestic
law. As a prudential matter, it makes no sense for the executive to
enter into international obligations on behalf of the United States and
then undertake no measures to insure U.S. compliance with those
obligations.
The Take Care Clause is not a grant of additional enforcement or
execution powers to the President. Rather, as Joseph Story put it,
“[t]he true interpretation of the clause is, that the President is to use
all such means as the Constitution and laws have placed at his disposal, to enforce the due execution of the laws.”304 The point is that the
President may not choose to enforce some laws and ignore others.305
In addition, although the Take Care Clause is not a source of new
presidential powers not otherwise delegated in Article II, it is an exhortation to the President to promote full compliance with the law,
not only by the executive branch but by all arms of the government.306
B. Avena, Medellı́n, and the Way Forward
In at least some respects, the Medellı́n opinion provides clear guidance. The Supreme Court has clearly found that the treaties at issue
in the case are non-self-executing and that the President’s memoran302. See supra note 195.
303. See Swaine, supra note 203, at 362 (contending that the Supreme Court has recognized that the Take Care Clause entails executive powers as well as duties).
304. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 292, at 178 (Lawbook Exchange 1999) (1840); see also MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 124 (2007) (“[T]he take–care clause . . . is phrased as a
duty, not a power; it does not give the President authority to enforce the law but only
imposes the obligation to use other presidential powers to that end.”).
305. See Swaine, supra note 203, at 360 (arguing that the Take Care Clause imposes an
affirmative duty on the President to enforce the law).
306. Id. at 370.
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dum is insufficient to override state law.307 If the President is serious
about implementing the Avena decision, the State of Texas itself, in its
Medellı́n merits brief, made clear what the executive needs to do: It
needs to coordinate with Congress or the States.308 Texas first suggested that the President could work with Congress to create a federal
exception to the state procedural rule that bars successive habeas petitions in cases involving violations of the VCCR.309 Texas next recommended that the President could simply enter into a bilateral
agreement with Mexico requiring federal judicial review of the cases
addressed in Avena.310 Finally, Texas proposed an executive panel to
provide the “review and reconsideration” required under Avena.311
Any findings of actual prejudice could be communicated to state pardon and parole boards along with a presidential request that the
panel’s recommendation “be given great weight in state clemency
proceedings.”312
Of these options, only the first has any meaningful likelihood of
rendering Avena enforceable in U.S. courts. A bilateral agreement
with Mexico would be no more self-executing than the U.N. Charter.
In connection with its proposal that the President establish an executive panel to provide review and reconsideration of cases like Medellı́n’s, Texas has stated that it would be willing to “accord considerable
weight” to executive findings of prejudice.313 This assertion is hard to
credit given that past requests from branches of the federal government in the context of VCCR litigation have gone unheeded. For example, the Governor of Virginia proceeded with the execution of
Angel Francisco Breard, despite Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s request urging him to await a ruling by the ICJ.314 Nor was
the State of Texas moved by Justice Stevens’s arguments that the
Court’s Medellı́n judgment does nothing to foreclose Texas from assuming the minimal costs involved in granting Medellı́n the review
and reconsideration required by the Avena decision.315 Notwithstanding this request, Texas executed Medellı́n on August 5, 2008, after the

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1371–72 (2008).
Brief for Respondent, supra note 178, at 46.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 46–47.
Id. at 47 n.32.
See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1374–75 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, refused to order a stay of
execution.316
The Bush Administration contended that it intervened most
forcefully on behalf of the Avena defendants. The President’s memorandum was, in and of itself, “extraordinary.”317 In both state court
proceedings and in the federal courts, the Bush Administration also
filed amicus briefs on behalf of Medellı́n and other Avena defendants.318 In addition, after the Court’s ruling in Medellı́n, the Bush Administration continued to attempt to persuade Texas to grant review
and reconsideration of Medellı́n’s case,319 until Medellı́n’s execution.
Although Medellı́n’s case ended with his death, the Avena case
continues. On June 5, 2008, Mexico filed with the ICJ a Request for
Interpretation of Judgment in the Avena case and a request for provisional measures.320 In that context, it is striking that the Bush Administration took no steps to work with Congress towards implementing
the Avena decision, as that is precisely the course of action prescribed
by the Medellı́n majority.321 During oral proceedings in the most recent ICJ case, Judge Bennouna asked the State Department’s Legal
Advisor, John Bellinger, about the views of the United States Congress
on the Avena judgment. Mr. Bellinger responded:
Congress has not in fact adopted legislation on this issue, so
there is no real way for me to represent to you the view of
our “Congress” as such . . . . It is worth noting though that—
even assuming a large number of individual Members of
Congress might agree that the Avena decision is binding as a
matter of international law—it does not necessarily mean
that Congress would adopt legislation on the point. Congress is a political body, and the actions of Members of Congress can be affected by a wide range of factors.322
True enough, but one of those factors is whether or not the executive
branch is pressuring members of Congress to pass a particular
316. James C. McKinley Jr., Texas Executes Mexican Despite Objections From Bush and International Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at A19.
317. Verbatim Record, supra note 80, ¶ 9, at 11.
318. Id. ¶ 10, at 11–12, ¶¶ 13–14, at 12–13.
319. Id. ¶ 21, at 16.
320. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (June 5, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/
14582.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
321. See Charnovitz, supra note 160, at 559 (reading Medellı́n as permitting Congress to
implement the Avena judgment through legislation, even if such legislation would reach
“‘deep into the heart of the State’s police powers’” (quoting Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1372)).
322. See Verbatim Record, supra note 80, ¶ 17, at 12.
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piece of legislation. That did not happen under the Bush
Administration.323
The treaties at issue in Medellı́n are not the only ones that are in
need of domestic implementation. The United States routinely attaches “reservations, understandings, and declarations” to the human
rights treaties it ratifies, declaring them to be non-self-executing.324
There is nothing wrong with this practice in and of itself, but some
human rights treaties specify that signatories must take all measures
necessary to implement their substantive provisions as domestic
law.325 By declaring these provisions to be non-self-executing and
then not executing them, the United States effectively renders its participation in the treaty regime meaningless for domestic purposes,
since domestic courts dismiss individual claims brought under such
human rights treaties on the basis that the treaties at issue are not selfexecuting and/or do not create a private right of action.326 Likewise,
U.S. Presidents’ failure to abide by their take care duties places the
United States in on-going violation of multiple treaty duties. For example, the Human Rights Committee, tasked with interpreting and
enforcing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,327
released a general comment in which it stated that Article 2 of the
Covenant “requires that States Parties take the necessary steps to give

323. Bellinger explains the government’s inaction as follows: “Given the short legislative
calendar for our Congress this year, it would not be possible for both houses of our Congress to pass legislation to give the President authority to implement the Avena decision.
There is simply not enough time.” Id. ¶ 26, at 17.
324. David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 139–42 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
325. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“Each State Party shall
take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 2, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (“[E]ach State Party to
the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the
present Covenant.”).
326. See Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 639 (2007) (explaining that United
States courts “have been virtually unanimous in the view that human rights treaty provisions are unenforceable absent implementing legislation”); see also Sloss, supra note 324, at
197–203 (summarizing judicial decisions that have dismissed individual claims brought
under human rights treaties).
327. See ICCPR, supra note 325, at art. 28 (establishing the Human Rights Committee
and setting forth its functions).
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effect to the Covenant rights in the domestic order.”328 When one
considers the Senate’s declaration that substantive provisions of the
Covenant are not self-executing, coupled with Congress’s failure to
execute the relevant provisions, in light of the the Human Rights
Committee’s comment, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that that the
United States is currently in violation of its obligations under the
Covenant.
On July 16, 2008, by a vote of seven to five, the ICJ ordered the
United States to take “all measures necessary to ensure” that five Mexican nationals, including Medellı́n, “are not executed pending judgment on [Mexico’s] Request for interpretation,” unless they are
accorded the review and reconsideration called for in the Avena judgment.329 This new order accords the executive a compelling opportunity to approach Congress to find a way out of this international
impasse. The Take Care Clause is unlikely to provide the basis for any
legal claim that the President has failed in his constitutional duties.
Rather, the mechanisms for the enforcement of the Take Care Clause
are political: the impeachment process and the ballot box.330 And so,
the best way to encourage the executive to abide by its take care duties
may be organizing at the grass roots level and through professional
organizations, such as the American Bar Association and the American Society of International Law, that can put pressure on the United
States Department of State to make the full implementation of treaties
a domestic priority.331 Happily, this is beginning to occur.332
328. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.
13 (May 26, 2004).
329. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in Avena and Other
Mexican National (Order of July 16, 2008) at ¶ 80, at 19, available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/139/14639.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
330. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, supra note 14, at 1233.
331. On July 17, 2008, the current and past presidents of the American Society of International Law sent letters to the U.S. Congress urging action to “ensure that the United
States lives up to its binding international legal obligations under the [VCCR] and the
United Nations Charter.” Letter from Lucy Reed, President of Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law et al.,
to Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader et al. (July 17, 2008), available at http://
www.asil.org/pdfs/presidentsletter.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
332. The Senate acted with remarkable alacrity to clarify the status of scores of treaties.
Between September 23 and September 26, 2008, the Senate gave its advice and consent to
nearly eighty treaties. In so doing, the Senate was careful to specify whether or not the
treaties were to be given direct effect as domestic law and whether they would give rise to a
private right of action. See 154 Cong. Rec. S9850 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2008) (granting advice
and consent to two treaties); 154 Cong. Rec. S9554–S9557 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (granting advice and consent to nine treaties); 154 Cong. Rec. S9328–S9335 (daily ed. Sept. 23,
2008) (granting advice and consent to sixty-seven treaties).
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V. CONCLUSION
It is always bad when the Supreme Court makes an unreasoned
decision. From that perspective, Medellı́n is no better or worse than
other decisions in which the Court’s self-proclaimed originalists have
departed from their allegiance to the Constitution in favor of their
own agendas. But Medellı́n is uniquely important because it is the first
Supreme Court decision that proclaims that there are to be no domestic consequences when the U.S. violates its international obligations.
The case sends a strong message to the United States’ trading partners
that it cannot be counted on. This regrettable decision may nonetheless result in a public good. It provides the opportunity for a new
administration, in reliance on its Take Care Clause duties, to work
aggressively with a new Congress to promote the United States’ full
participation in and compliance with the treaties that it has ratified.

